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RELOADING THE ARSENAL IN THE INFORMATIONAL WAR
ON POLLUTION-CITIZENS AS SOLDIERS IN THE FIGHT
AND HOW A LACK OF "ACTIONABLE" LEGS ON WHICH
TO STAND NEARLY FORCED A CEASE-FIRE
I. INTRODUGTION
The modem era of technology brought with it potential envi-
ronmental hazards, including chemicals that can destroy not only
plant life, but human life as well.1 In response to this reality, Con-
gress enacted various pieces of legislation designed to manage these
potential problems.2 One such act is the Emergency Planning and
Community-Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA), 3 which requires owners
and operators to report hazardous substances releases and enables
communities to create emergency response plans and commis-
sions.4 Like other environmental legislation, EPCRA provides for
1. After a massive chemical spill in Bhopal, India, some residents there suf-
fered medical problems, including difficulties with their lungs, eyes and gastroin-
testinal tract. See Newsfront Bhopal, A Year Later: Learning From a Tragedy, CHEM.
ENG'G, Dec. 9, 1985, available in 1985 WL 2163517 [hereinafter Newsfront Bhopal].
Doctors also found problems with the exposed residents' immune systems and pre-
dicted the possibility of birth defects in future generations. See id. See also Under a
Noxious Cloud of Fear; A Toxic Gas Leak Rocks "Chemical Valley" Residents, TIME, Aug.
26, 1985, at 13 [hereinafter Noxious Cloud] (comparing chemical accidents in Bho-
pal, India and Institute, West Virginia). One reporter noted:
Responding to alarm about the Bhopal, India, gas-leak disaster and lesser
chemical calamities in this country, Congress . . . passed the Emergency
Planning and Community-Right-To-Know Act. It is intended to let citi-
zens know more about the dangerous substances used in their communi-
ties, and to stimulate the development of emergency plans for dealing
with chemical mishaps.
Gary H. Anthes, Chemical Disclosure Law Brings Burden, WASH. Bus.J., Apr. 27, 1987,
at 3. But see Noxious Cloud, supra, at 13 (noting conflict of interest between job
security and health security, as "most residents of West Virginia's Chemical Valley
were caught between worries about their safety and about their region's
economy.").
2. See, e.g., Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671 (1994) [hereinafter CAA]; Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean
Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) [hereinafter CWA]; Emergency Plan-
ning and Community-Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994) [here-
inafter EPCRA].
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). See also Emergency Planning and Com-
munity-Right-To-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374
(providing statute and background information).
4. See EPCRA §§ 301-13, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-23. For a background analysis of
this statute, see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
(127)
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citizen suits to enforce violations of this Act.5 Viewed as an effective
and favored tool of enforcement, citizen suits permit activist groups
to gain access to the federal courts without having to wait for regu-
latory agencies to investigate or take action against reported
violations. 6
Citizens traditionally have been able to sue for active violations
of an environmental statute.7 Currently, however, a controversy ex-
ists regarding whether citizens may sue for wholly past violations of
an environmental act.8 Since most citizen suit provisions require
sixty-days' notice before filing suit,9 an alleged violator often has
time to cure the violation before the actual filing of a suit. 10 After
the "curing" of any active violation, the controversy remains as to
5. See EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046; see also CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604;
CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. For a description of these provisions and relevant
case law, see infra notes 40-124 and accompanying text.
6. SeeJack D. Shumate, Citizen Enforcement Suits: Will An Old Tool Take on New
Importance?, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 55, 57 (1996) (explaining that due to increase in
environmental problems, businesses as well as public interest groups are relying on
citizen suits to manage environmentally-related issues); see alsoJim Scott, Note, Per-
missibility of Citizen Suits Under EPCRA for Wholly Past Violations in the Seventh Circuit:
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., 4 Wis. ENvrL. L.J. 215, 217 (1997) (not-
ing that early on, citizen suits emerged as "a small, but effective, part of the en-
forcement effort").
7. See Katarina K. B6er, Comment, United Musical Instruments v. The Steel
Company: The Conflict Over the Safety of Our Communities and the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1599, 1602-11 (1997) (present-
ing statutory overview of citizen suit provisions in environmental law).
8. For a discussion of cases addressing whether citizens may sue for wholly
past violations, see infra notes 53-124 and accompanying text. The United States
Supreme Court described wholly past violations as those violations of an act which
occur entirely before the plaintiff files a lawsuit. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 49-50 (1987) (addressing wholly past
violations with respect to CWA).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997), and heard oral arguments during the first day of its
Fall Term of 1997. SeeJan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Reopens Over High-Stakes
Turf War, CHI. TPIB., Oct. 7, 1997, at 8N (describing these events). The Court
rendered its decision in Steel Co. on March 4, 1998, concluding that the environ-
mental group lacked standing to bring suit for wholly past violations under EP-
CRA. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (Stevens,J.,
concurring). See generally Scott, supra note 6, at 216 ("The paucity of case law belies
the importance of citizen suits, which hold the promise of maturing into an effec-
tive means to achieve compliance.").
9. See CAA § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b); CWA § 505(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b); EPCRA § 326(d), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d). For a discussion of notice pro-
visions in the context of case law, see infra notes 59-61, 86-87, 114-18 and accompa-
nying text.
10. For a discussion of the sequence of events between the discovery of a vio-
lation, the filing of notice and the filing of suit, see infra notes 43-44 and accompa-
nying text.
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whether the alleged violator can be sued for violations which oc-
curred before the "curing."11
This Comment examines the controversy of citizen suits for
wholly past violations in light of the recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, which in-
volved wholly past violations of EPCRA. 12 Part II of this Comment
examines the factual context and holding of Steel Co.13 Next, Part
III provides a brief background of EPCRA.14 Then, Part IV analyzes
courts' various interpretations regarding EPCRA and suits for
wholly past violations.15 Finally, Part V discusses the significance
and impact of recent court decisions on enforcement of violations
under EPCRA. 16
II. WHAT ARE CITIZEN SOLDIERS: ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR
MERELY PRIVATE CITIZENS?
A. The Controversy Over Citizen Soldiers in Steel Co.
Originating from an appeal in the Seventh Circuit, Steel Co. in-
volved a non-profit environmental organization, Citizens for a Bet-
ter Environment (Citizens), which sued an industrial company for
failure to file reports in accordance with EPCRA.17 Citizens sent
notice to the appropriate parties in 1995.18 Because the Environ-
11. For a discussion of case law examining whether suits may be maintained
under such circumstances, see infra notes 53-124 and accompanying text. "One of
the more significant issues within [EPCRA's] citizen-suit provision is whether citi-
zens may bring suit for reporting violations that are wholly past and have been
corrected before a citizen suit is filed." Denise Marie Lohmann, Comment, The
Uncertain Future of Citizen Suits Under EPCRA: Can Citizens Sue for Past Violations of the
Statute's Reporting Requirements? 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1709, 1710 (1997). This ambi-
guity results in frequent litigation. See id. Another key issue in this type of litiga-
tion is standing. See Robert B. June, The Structure of Standing Requirements For Citizen
Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENvri. L. 761, 762 (1994) (recognizing
"tension between legislative endowment and judicial restraint of a citizen's right to
enforce environmental laws has generated several interacting doctrines which
sometimes produce great difficulty in determining the range of citizens who have
standing to sue").
12. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
13. For a discussion of the court's holding in Steel Co., see infra notes 17-38
and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the background of EPCRA, see infra notes 40-124 and
accompanying text.
15. For an analysis of various courts' holdings regarding EPCRA and suits for
wholly past violations, see infra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact decisions in EPCRA cases have on future
industry behavior and cases, see infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
17. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1008-09.
18. See id. at 1009. For a discussion of the notice provision in citizen suits, see
infra notes 59-61, 86-87, 114-18 and accompanying text.
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) chose not to prosecute, when the
sixty-day notice period expired, Citizens filed suit against Steel
Company in federal court. 19 The defendant Steel Company moved
for dismissal because their filings were now current, even though
prior to notice of intent to sue Steel Company had failed to submit
the appropriate forms since 1988, which was the first year of the
filing requirements.20 The district court agreed with Steel Com-
pany's argument and dismissed the complaint. 21 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, recognizing that penalties can be imposed for wholly
past violations; namely, for failure to timely file the appropriate re-
ports under EPCRA.22 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
"to resolve a conflict between the interpretation of EPCRA adopted
by the Seventh Circuit and the interpretation previously adopted by
the Sixth Circuit" including the issue of standing, which is a consti-
tutional requirement in bringing a suit.23
B. The Supreme Court's "Bombshell" Decision
On March 4, 1998, five months after hearing oral argument in
the landmark case of Steel Co.,2 4 the Supreme Court declared:
Having found that none of the relief sought by respon-
dent would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, we must
conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this
suit, and that we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to
entertain it. However desirable prompt resolution of the
merits EPCRA question may be, it is not as important as
observing the constitutional limits set upon courts in our
system of separated powers. EPCRA will have to await an-
other day.2 5
Choosing to focus on constitutional issues first, the majority side-
stepped a prominent statutory issue of the case, whether EPCRA
permits suits for wholly past violations, and rendered the issue
19. See id. at 1009.
20. See id. (noting that defendant filed all of its overdue forms immediately
after receiving notice).
21. See id.
22. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., see infra notes 77-87 and
accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
25. Id. at 1020.
4
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outside of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. 2 6 Relying on its previ-
ous decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion, Inc.,27 the Court concluded that the respondent, Citizens, had
not met the redressability requirement.28 Despite citizens' failure
to meet this requirement, the Court did not explicitly restrict suits
for wholly past violations under EPCRA.2 9
The Court also rejected the "doctrine of hypothetical jurisdic-
tion," under which a court may proceed directly to the merits of an
issue, even if jurisdictional questions exist, if the court can resolve
26. See id. at 1018-20 (explaining that "[rielief that does not remedy the injury
suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of
the redressability requirement.").
27. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
28. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1007, 1010-11, 1018-20 (describing Court's use of
its Gwaltney opinion and statement that plaintiff did not meet redressability re-
quirement). The Court suggested, however, that respondents could have met the
redressability requirement if they had alleged "a continuing violation or the immi-
nence of a future violation" in their complaint, thereby making injunctive relief
appropriate. Id. at 1019.
Steel Company, petitioner, argued in its brief that a person must have a per-
sonal interest that is somehow either harmed, or threatened with harm, to have
standing, even though the statute authorizes any person to sue. See generally Peti-
tioner's Brief at 29, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998)
(No. 9-643) (citing EPCRA § 326(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)). Steel Company as-
serted that "[h]ad Congress thought a citizen remedy for past EPCRA violations
appropriate, it could have fashioned such a remedy. This Court should not find
an implied one." Id. at 34.
The United States, one of several amici for the respondent (Citizens), "ar-
gue[d] that the injunctive relief does constitute remediation because 'there is a
presumption of [future] injury when the defendant has voluntarily ceased its ille-
gal activity in response to litigation,' even if that occurs before a complaint is
filed." Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1019-20 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 27-28 & n.11, Steel Co. (No. 96-643)). Although the United States
presented a strong argument regarding redressability, the Court refused to accept
the argument, stating that the injury the United States set forth was both too spec-
ulative as well as contrary to the Court's precedent of requiring "that the allega-
tions of future injury be particular and concrete." Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020
(citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-97 (1974)).
The Gwaltney decision focused on CWA, which is distinguishable from EPCRA.
For a discussion of the Gwaltney opinion, see infra notes 53-67 and accompanying
text. For an analysis of CWA and EPCRA and how the two Acts can be distin-
guished, see infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
29. See Tod Robinson, Emergency Planning: Supreme Court Says Citizen Group
Cannot Sue Over Past EPCRA Violations, DAILY ENVrL. REPORT, Mar. 5, 1998, at A-2
(stating that, although total effect of Scalia's opinion is unclear, it leaves open
possibility "that private citizens may have standing to sue companies that present a
threat of future violations because of their history of ignoring their EPCRA obliga-
tions"). Cf Jan Crawford Greenburg, A Blow to Environmental Suits: Ruling on Chi-
cago Firm May Stall Citizen Action, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 1998, at IN
[hereinafter Chicago Reaction] (explaining that one attorney for respondent Citi-
zens "predicted that the ruling would have a broad impact because citizens' groups
would be less vigilant about urging companies to comply with environmental laws
if they couldn't sue to recover expenses").
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the merits more easily and if "the prevailing party on the merits
would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction de-
nied. o30 According to the Court, the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers both limits the Court to hearing only those cases over which it
has jurisdiction as well as prohibits it from rendering opinions on
hypothetical questions.31 Finding jurisdiction to be a threshold
matter, the Court observed that "'j]urisdiction is power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause."' 32 Thus, the Court held that it did not have the constitu-
tional authority to consider the substantive question of whether citi-
zen suits for wholly past violations are viable under EPCRA.33
By not requiring that citizens receive the statutorily-mandated
information in a timely fashion, the Supreme Court's holding pro-
vides a near fatal wound for citizen suits for wholly past violations.3 4
This holding increases the risk to people and their environment,
thereby rendering EPCRA essentially invalid.35
Unlike the majority, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
stated that the Court should have addressed the statutory question
first and that "because EPCRA, properly construed, does not confer
jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations, the Court
30. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1007 (citations omitted).
31. See id. at 1007, 1012 ("We decline to endorse such an approach because it
carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus of-
fends fundamental principles of separation of powers."). Further, the Constitution
plainly states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and .... to Contro-
versies ... between Citizens of different States .. " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Constitution neither states, nor has it been interpreted to mean, that hypo-
thetical cases and controversies are part of this judicial power. See, e.g., Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868) (emphasizing that "judicial duty is not
less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly
that which the Constitution and the laws confer").
32. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. at 514).
The Court proceeded to recognize that jurisdiction is an inflexible requirement
that must be addressed regardless of whether either party raises the issue. See Steel
Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012.
33. See id. at 1016. The Court noted that "[m]uch more than legal niceties
are at stake here. The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements ofjurisdic-
tion are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, re-
straining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from
acting permanently regarding certain subjects." Id. (citations omitted).
34. See Chicago Reaction, supra note 29, at IN (noting that Citizens' attorney,
James Brusslan, "predicted that the ruling would have a broad impact because citi-
zens' groups would be less vigilant about urging companies to comply with envi-
ronmental laws if they couldn't sue to recover expenses").
35. See Janet A. Brown & Jeremy Rosen, Supreme Court Review, Spring 1998
Term: Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 957, 957-
58, 969-70 (1998) (explaining potential impact of Supreme Court's decision).
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should leave the constitutional question for another day."'3 6 Re-
gardless of where a Supreme CourtJustice begins the analysis, how-
ever, the conclusion is essentially the same: the Court will not
permit citizens to bring suits for wholly past violations under EP-
CRA because, under either the Constitution or the statute itself, the
Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear such cases. 3 7 The Supreme
Court has declared that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to
hear cases concerning allegations of wholly past violations under
EPCRA since aggrieved parties do not have the necessary standing
to bring such actions. 38
III. BACKGROUND
Environmental legislation became a prominent legal issue with
Congress's introduction of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the
Superfund. Since then, environmental legislation has expanded
and now covers many relevant domains, including the need for
information.3 9
36. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1021. Only a minority of justices posited this con-
cept of lack ofjurisdiction, signifying that the Court has not declared the law to be
that EPCRA does not permit suits for wholly past violations. See id. at 1021-27 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (discussing jurisdictional issue). Therefore, if the legislature
resolves standing problems, the Court could later interpret EPCRA as permitting
suits for wholly past violations, thereby indicating that the citizens' arsenal in this
informational war on pollution has not yet been fully depleted. See generally June,
supra note 11, at 762, 793-94 (explaining Congress's role in prescribing standing).
This commentator clarified that "[iun simple terms, the Constitution limits who
may have standing, while Congress prescribes who shall have standing. Given these
bounds, the courts then decide if a party has standing in an individual case. As a
result, standing is primarily a function of congressional directive." Id. at 793 (em-
phasis added).
Justice Stevens proceeded by demonstrating that the Court has the power to
address whether a cause of action exists even if the standing of the alleged ag-
grieved party is questionable. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1024 (stating "our prece-
dents clearly support the proposition that, given a choice between two
jurisdictional questions-one statutory and the other constitutional-the Court
has the power to answer the statutory question first"). Later in his opinion, buried
in the text of a footnote,Justice Stevens proclaimed, "I have never understood any
fundamental difference between arguing: (1) plaintiff's complaint does not allege
a cause of action because the law does 'not provide a remedy' for the plaintiffs
injury; and (2) plaintiff's injury is 'not redressable.'" Id. at 1024 n.9 (citation
omitted).
37. See id. at 1023-24.
38. See id. at 1024. During this era of the information superhighway, a high
value is assigned to timely and accurate information. So how is it justifiable that
there is almost no enforcement for failure to provide timely information under
EPCRA?
39. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Frame-
work to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 Ky. L.J. 803 (1996-97)
(surveying environmental laws and related enforcement techniques).
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A. EPCRA and Its Statutory Foundations
Congress enacted EPCRA in response to problems with the
public's exposure to hazardous substances.40 EPCRA has two pri-
mary objectives: "[(1)] public access to centralized information, at a
reasonably localized level, concerning hazardous chemicals used,
produced or stored in the community and [ (2)] the use of this in-
formation to formulate and administer local emergency response
plans in case of a hazardous chemical release."4 1 These objectives
40. See Newsfront Bhopal, supra note 1, at 1985 WL 2163517. One year after a
massive chemical spill in Bhopal, India, both chemical manufacturers and the gen-
eral population questioned whether current laws were sufficient to protect Ameri-
cans from a similar fate. See id. While international responses to the Bhopal
disaster varied greatly, "[iun the U.S., where a lot of ambitious legislation was pro-
posed in the months immediately following Bhopal, only one measure - a com-
munity-right-to-know amendment tacked on to the Senate's Superfund
reauthorization bill ... made any headway." Id. The bill provision required both
reporting of hazardous chemicals as well as emergency response plans in case of
accidents involving one of these hazardous chemicals. See id.
In EPA's records of accidents involving hazardous chemicals, it was discovered
that between 1980 and 1985 as a result of "3,121 accidents, 138 people were re-
ported killed and 4,717 were injured. In 341 of those accidents, 217,000 people
were evacuated. Property damage exceeding $1.5 billion was reported in 476 of
the events." Chicago Tribune, Hazardous-Chemical Leaks Still Taking Toll in U.S.,
Report Says, SEArrTLE TIMES, Dec. 24, 1986, at A2. Further, firefighters recognize
that because certain chemical fires become worse with water, "[h ] aving the proper
training and equipment can make the difference between firefighters safely trying
to control the incident" or being forced to let the fire run its natural course. Legis-
lation Would Give Firefighters Data on Toxins, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS,
Dec. 8, 1987, available in 1987 WL 2778125. Fire chiefs also view EPCRA as valua-
ble since "it mandates that lines of communication be opened between industry
and emergency personnel." Id.
In an amicus brief filed in Steel Co., the amici argued:
Their members [the members of the organizations submitting the brief]
live, breathe the air, and engage in recreational activities in areas affected
by releases of toxic chemicals by companies regulated under EPCRA.
These toxic chemicals are known to cause significant adverse effects on
human health and the environment. Amicis' members use data reported
by facilities under EPCRA to learn about toxic chemical releases in their
communities.
Amicus Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Sierra Club, United
States Public Interest Research Group, Friends of the Earth, Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Tennessee Environmental Council,
Ecology Center of Ann Arbor, Inc., Communities for a Better Environment, Cold
Mountain, Cold Rivers, Inc., Don't Waste Arizona, Citizens for Environmental
Compliance, and Ecological Consultants for the Public Interest, at 1-2, Steel Co.
(No. 96-643).
41. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F.
Supp. 745, 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). In creating this statute, both the House and the
Senate agreed that they should design both to provide information to communi-
ties about hazardous chemicals in their neighborhoods as well as establish meth-
ods for planning for emergency response needs. See Emergency Planning and
Community-Right-To-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3374.
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are achieved through three reporting systems, under which owners
and operators must provide information about hazardous sub-
stances to local, state and federal authorities. 42
EPCRA also provides for citizen suits for violations of its provi-
sions.43 Typically, a potential plaintiff files notice of intent to sue,
42. See EPCRA §§ 311-13, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-23 (providing three different re-
porting requirements: (1) material safety data sheets; (2) emergency and hazard-
ous chemical inventory forms; and (3) toxic chemical release forms). The section
on emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms describes two tiers, Tier I
and Tier II. See EPCRA § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 11022. Tier I requires the following
information:
(i) An estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of hazardous
chemicals in each category present at the facility at any time during
the preceding calendar year.
(ii) An estimate (in ranges) of the average daily amount of hazardous
chemicals in each category present at the facility during the preced-
ing calendar year.
(iii) The general location of hazardous chemicals in each category.
Id. § 312(d) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(1)(B).
This section also provides for more detailed information in certain cases
where a government entity or private citizen has requested this information. See id.
§ 312(e), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e). Tier II requires the following under those
circumstances:
(A) The chemical name or the common name of the chemical as pro-
vided on the material safety data sheet.
(B) An estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of the hazardous
chemical present at the facility at any time during the preceding cal-
endar year.
(C) An estimate (in ranges) of the average daily amount of the hazard-
ous chemical present at the facility during the preceding calendar
year.
(D) A brief description of the manner of storage of the hazardous
chemical.
(E) The location at the facility of the hazardous chemical.
(F) An indication of whether the owner elects to withhold location infor-
mation of a specific hazardous chemical from disclosure to the pub-
lic under section 11044 of this title.
Id. § 312(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d) (2). See MatthewJ. Smith, Note, "Thou Shalt
Not Violate!": Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act Authorizes Citizen
Suits for Wholly Past Violations - Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 10 PAcE ENVTL. L. Ruv. 1051, 1060-65 (1993)
(identifying reporting requirements and explaining their importance in effectuat-
ing EPCRA's purpose and policy). In applying these reporting standards, however,
"the question of whether a facility is subject to EPCRA regulation differs greatly
from section to section." Id. at 1063. See also Eric M. Falkenberry, The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act: A Tool for Toxic Release Reduction in the
90's, 3 Burr. ENvrL. L.J. 1, 9 (1995) (explaining that EPA is permitted to set thresh-
old quantities of hazardous substances for reporting requirements under Section
311 (Material Safety Data Sheet)).
43. See EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046. Unless the EPA Administrator is al-
ready diligently pursuing a cause of action against an alleged violator:
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against the
following:
9
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the potential defendant files the reports necessary to "cure" the vio-
lation, and then the potential plaintiff actually files suit.44 There-
fore, courts are left to decide the relatively novel issue of whether
plaintiffs may sue defendants for violations which occurred before
the defendant remedied the violation.
The typical sequence of events for citizen suits raises concerns
regarding the timeliness of providing information as required
under EPCRA.45 The legislative history of EPCRA, which is found
under the Superfund amendments of 1986 where EPCRA was cre-
ated, suggests that a primary reason for the Act is to protect public
health and the environment, which cannot be fully achieved with-
(A) An owner or operator of a facility for failure to do any of the
following:
(i) Submit a followup emergency notice under section 11004(c)
of this title.
(ii) Submit a material safety data sheet or a list under section
11021(a) of this title.
(iii) Complete and submit an inventory form under section
11022(a)of this title containing tier I information as described
in section 11022(d)(1) of this title unless such requirement
does not apply by reason of the second sentence of section
11022(a) (2) of this title.
(iv) Complete and submit a toxic chemical release form under sec-
tion 11023(a) of this title.
Id. § 326(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (1). A citizen may also sue the EPA Adminis-
trator or governmental entities under this statute. See id. § 326(a) (1) (B), (C), (D),
42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (1) (B), (C), (D).
44. For a discussion of district court cases following this sequence of events,
see infra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
45. See Randall S. Abate, Rethinking Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal En-
vironmental Laws: Recommendations for the Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltney Stan-
dard, 16 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 25-27 (1997) (discussing need for timely
information and lack of temporal limitations in citizen suits for EPCRA violations).
This author noted that in Steel Co.:
[t]he issue before the Court is whether Congress, in enacting EPCRA's
citizen suit provision, intended to authorize citizens to seek penalties for
violations that were cured before a citizen suit is filed, "thereby granting
EPCRA citizen suit plaintiffs greater enforcement authority than that
granted to other citizen suit plaintiffs under other federal environmental
statutes."
Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
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out timely information. 46 In discussing these amendments, 4 7 Sena-
tor Stafford noted that in applying legal rules, principles of both
law and equity should guide a court's decision. 48 Further, Senator
Stafford stated that "[o]ne guideline should be to view less favora-
bly the arguments of those who failed to participate when they
knew or should have known that they had an opportunity to do
so.49
Later in the Senate's discussion of the bill to amend CERC[A
and create EPCRA, Senator Stafford noted that "citizens have a
right to know about these [hazardous] chemicals - what they are,
46. See Whiting 772 F. Supp. at 751 (stating that "legislative history also dem-
onstrates Congress' particular concern that hazardous chemical information be
readily accessible at the community level"). In discussing citizen suits, one com-
mentator noted that
[t] he notion of citizen suits proved so logical that Congress included sim-
ilar provisions in nearly every major piece of environmental legislation
passed since 1970. The intent and effect of these provisions is to em-
power citizens and groups with the legal tools necessary to protect their
health and environment when government enforcers cannot - or will
not - press forward.
Robert W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of the Public's
Right-To-Know, 2 ALB. L. ENVrL. OuTLooK 29, 29 (Fall 1995) (footnote omitted).
In examining the legislative history of EPCRA and its citizen suit provisions,
one finds a limited amount of information. See Smith, supra note 42, at 1055.
Within this sparse history, however, there exists the theme "of a desire to protect
the public by providing valuable information on hazardous chemicals located in
their local communities, which can be used to formulate emergency plans." Id.
47. See 132 CONG. REC. S14,895-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Stafford). When Congress enacted amendments to the Superfund in 1986, how-
ever, it created two separate citizen suit provisions - one for CERCLA and one for
EPCRA. See Abate, supra note 45, at 25. Focusing on language differences, one
commentator explained the significance of Congress creating two provisions:
The CERCLA citizen suit provision authorizes suit against persons "al-
leged to be in violation" of CERCLA, while EPCRA's citizen suit provision
contains no such limitation. Thus, it is fair to assume that Congress in-
tended EPCRA's citizen suit provision to authorize enforcement against
persons who were no longer "in violation" at the time of suit.
Id. at 26.
48. See 132 CONG. REc. S14,895-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Stafford).
49. Id. While Senator Stafford's statement referred more specifically to re-
movals under the Superfund, the general concept should also be applied to EP-
CRA since it is part of the same series of amendments. Senator Stafford further
commented:
This [framework] is because in choosing to abstain from the administra-
tive process such parties, through their own volition, prolonged and com-
plicated a process intended to protect human health and the
environment. Such conscious decisions to knowingly increase the risks
associated with these poisonous chemicals, motivated by economic self
interest or litigation strategy should cause a court to presume that the
parties enter without clean hands.
11
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where they are, and how much of them is [sic] present."50 Repre-
sentative Lent noted, in the House's debate on this bill, that while
the intent of the bill is to provide information to the community,
the "avalanche of unnecessary paperwork" may make its implemen-
tation impossible. 51 Representative Lent also suggested that as long
as the information is organized, it is a valuable item to which the
community should have access. 52
B. The Courts' Application of EPCRA
1. Gwaltney: The First Examination of Citizen Suits for Wholly
Past Violations
The Judiciary first addressed the issue of citizen suits based on
wholly past violations in a suit filed under the Clean Water Act
50. Id. at S14,907. EPCRA is a reactionary measure that Congress created in
response to chemical spills which made the public very aware of the hazardous
chemicals present in their neighborhoods. See id. To prepare for emergencies,
communities need to know what kinds and how much of the hazardous chemicals
are present. See id. Also, according to Senator Stafford, "U]ust as the public has a
right to know about releases that might happen as a result of an accident, the
public also has a right to know about releases that do happen every hour and every
day that some manufacturing facilities operate." Id.
One commentator explained the congressional reaction as follows:
The potential for another Bhopal in the United States was alarmingly
real. The two disasters [Bhopal, India and Institute, West Virginia] and
the toxic chemical statistics motivated Congress to pass EPCRA, a law that
would "provide for the development of local emergency response plans
... [,] give important information... about hazardous chemicals present
at facilities ... [,] [a]nd ... require that people be informed of hazard-
ous chemicals that are present in their communities."
Lohmann, supra note 11, at 1715 (internal citations omitted, first alteration
added).
51. 132 CONG. REc. H9561-03, H9564 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Lent). Representative Hammerschmidt agreed with Representative Lent,
commenting that:
Another burdensome area of the legislation is the community right to
know provision. I agree with the basic premise that a community located
near a hazardous wastesite should be aware of chemicals that threaten
them, and I have no quarrel with a proper role for the Federal Govern-
ment in that effort.
Unfortunately, the community right to know title in this bill goes far be-
yond that. It would, in fact, place a tremendous burden on industry, and,
in my judgment, an unmanageable burden on State and local
government.
There are plenty of requirements but no funds to help State and local
governments comply with the law. Consequently, there is the potential
for massive noncompliance; and where companies do comply with the
law, State and local agencies will be inundated with paperwork, thereby
rendering the whole exercise useless.
Id. at H9568.
52. See id. at H9564 (explaining that mere piles of paper would not be useful
and calling on EPA to assist in organizing information).
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(CWA).53 In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that CWA's provision for citizen suits
does not permit suits based on wholly past violations.54 The Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation and the Natural Resources Defense Council,
two not-for-profit organizations, sued Gwaltney for violating condi-
tions of a permit allowing certain pollutant releases within effluent
limitations.55 From 1981 through 1984, the period in question,
Gwaltney installed new equipment, thus bringing its pollutant emis-
sions within the prescribed standards set out in the permit issued
pursuant to CWA. 56
Focusing on the plain language of CWA, the Supreme Court
explained that the plain language of the statute does not authorize
suits for wholly past violations.57 Specifically, the Court stated that
CWA does not explicitly state that such suits are permissible. 58 The
Supreme Court reasoned that Congress could have used specific
language to identify this intent, but instead remained silent on the
issue. 59 Further, the Supreme Court found that Congress's use of
present tense verbs in CWA suggested that violations must be pres-
53. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (discussing availability of wholly past violations under CWA). See also CWA
§ 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). This section provides:
[A] ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf -
(1) against any person .. . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation.
Id. § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
54. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 49-50. The district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit had held that such suits were permissible under section
505(a) of CWA. See id. at 54-56.
The Court found that a wholly past violation involves violations of an act
which occur entirely before the plaintiff files a lawsuit. See id. at 55. The violation,
however, can be active at the time a violator receives notice of intent to sue, but
may be cured by the time the plaintiff actually files the lawsuit. See id. at 55-56.
55. See id. at 53-54 (stating Gwaltney exceeded use limits for five of seven
chemicals listed in permit). Gwaltney's most substantial violations involved fecal
coliform, chlorine and total Kjeldahl nitrogen. See id. at 53.
56. See id. at 53-54 (explaining that Chesapeake Bay Foundation filed suit in
June 1984, after violations ended).
57. See id. at 57-61. Interestingly, the Gwaltney decision "is perhaps the most
extensively analyzed yet most frequently misunderstood standard in citizen suit ju-
risprudence under federal environmental laws. Ten years after the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Gwaltney, federal courts continue to struggle to ascertain the
scope and applicability of the Gwaltney standard." Abate, supra note 45, at 1.
58. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57-58.
59. See id. The Court commented that although Congress could have specifi-
cally indicated that although EPCRA was intended to be a past, as well as forward,
looking statute, it did not do so. See id. The Court further noted that "Congress
has demonstrated in yet other statutory provisions that it knows how to avoid this
prospective implication by using language that explicitly targets wholly past viola-
13
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ently occurring in order to maintain a suit for such violations. 60 Ad-
ditionally, in examining the notice requirement, the Supreme
Court explained that this requirement allows time for compliance,
which is a goal of enforcement. 61
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court also examined the role of citi-
zens in enforcing these environmental protection laws. The Court
stated that "the common central purpose of permitting citizens to
abate pollution [is to assist the government] when the government
cannot or will not command compliance." 62 Further, the Court
recognized that "[p] ermitting citizen suits for wholly past violations
of the Act could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for
the citizen suit."63
tions." Id. at 57. The Court provided the Solid Waste Disposal Act as an example.
See id.
60. See id. at 59 (noting that "[this definition [of citizen as someone being
adversely affected] makes plain what the undeviating use of the present tense
strongly suggests: the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the
present or the future, not in the past."). In reviewing the legislative history of
CWA, the Court noted, " [m] embers of Congress frequently characterized the citi-
zen suit provisions as 'abatement' provisions or as injunctive measures." Id. at 61.
In reviewing the development of environmental citizen suits, one commenta-
tor analyzed the CAA model, stating "[tihe Senate report [concerning the Clean
Air Act amendments of 1970] did not discuss the disposition of the citizen suit if
the alleged violator came into compliance during the notice period. However, the
Committee encouraged courts to award the citizen plaintiff reasonable litigation
expenses even when the defendant corrected the violation before the court issued
its verdict in the case." Jeffrey A. Keithline, Note, Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-To-Know Citizen Suits: Should the Supreme Court Extend Gwaltney? 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1227, 1236-37 (1997).
61. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. The Supreme Court also explained that per-
mitting citizen suits for wholly past violations would render the notice provision
"gratuitous" and that even if the alleged violator came into compliance after notifi-
cation, it would still be subject to litigation. See id. For a discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's alternative explanations for the notice provision of EPCRA, see infra
notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 49, 62. James Hecker, an environmental enforcement attorney,
stated, "[i]t is my view that Congress has given citizens a hybrid cause of action to
vindicate a mixture of public and private rights. Citizens assert their own rights to
be free of harm from pollutant releases, but their enforcement powers are similar
to those of the government." James M. Hecker, The Citizen's Role in Environmental
Enforcement: Private Attorney General, Private Citizen, or Both?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T. 31, 31 n.4 (1994). He further recognized that "[ciitizen suits allow persons
outside of government to prosecute violators for the same type of civil offenses
under environmental laws as the government, and thereby create a prosecutorial
alternative to the established order." Id. at 62. For an explanation of the policy
arguments in favor of citizen suits for wholly past violations of EPCRA, see infra
notes 137-62 and accompanying text.
63. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added). A critical review of citizen
suits reveals that while citizen suits have existed for many years, there has recently
been an explosion in the number of such suits filed. See Ross Macfarlane & Lori
Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. RESOURCES
[Vol. X: p. 127
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In concluding its opinion, the Court briefly discussed standing,
explaining that a plaintiff must make allegations in good faith in
order to meet the threshold of standing. 64 The Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff may maintain standing by alleging continuing
violations of the statute where repetition of violations is likely.65
Otherwise, mootness prevents a plaintiff from maintaining stand-
ing.66 The Court did not analyze the redressability requirement of
standing in this case.
6 7
2. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit Split
Thus far, only two circuits have considered the issue of citizen
suits based on wholly past violations under EPCRA.68 Both the
Sixth and the Seventh Circuits analyzed a situation where a not-for-
profit organization sued a company EPCRA regulated for violations
of the reporting requirements under the statute. 69 The Sixth Cir-
cuit concluded that citizen suits for wholly past violations are not
allowed under EPCRA, whereas the Seventh Circuit concluded the
& ENV'T. 20, 20 n.4 (1997). The following observation may explain the explosion
in the number of suits:
In previous decades, most suits were brought for one of three reasons: to
set favorable precedents, to target highly visible sources, or to respond to
local community concerns. Today, these suits are being prosecuted
whenever there is evidence of a violation. Citizen attorneys are using law
students and paralegals to cull through agency files and are filing notices
without any prior knowledge of the facility.
Id. at 20.
64. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65-66 (explaining that defendant has opportunity
to show allegations are untrue and that once plaintiff offers evidence concerning
allegations, case goes to trial on its merit). The Court further commented that
"the Constitution does not require that the plaintiff offer this proof as a threshold
matter in order to invoke the District Court's jurisdiction." Id. at 66.
65. See id. at 64-67 (holding that good faith allegations of continuing viola-
tions may be sufficient to maintain cause of action and remanding case to deter-
mine whether good faith allegation existed).
66. See id. (citations omitted).
67. See id. at 65-67. See generally June, supra note 11, at 767-93 (discussing de-
velopment of, and possible limitations on, standing under citizen suits).
68. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996)
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United
Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995) (both addressing citizen suits
brought under EPCRA based on wholly past violations).
69. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1237; United Musica4 61 F.3d at 473-74. On Febru-
ary 24, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Steel Co. See
Emergency Planning: Supreme Court Agrees to Review Legality of EPCRA Citizen Suits for
Past Violations, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2177 (Feb. 28, 1997) (citing Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for a Better Env't, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997)). Oral arguments were heard on
October 6, 1997 as part of the opening session of the Supreme Court's Fall Term.
See Greenburg, supra note 8, at 8N.
15
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opposite, finding that citizen suits for wholly past violations are per-
missible under the Act.70
Both circuits reviewed the language of EPCRA in reaching
their conclusions. 71 In Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc., v. United
Musical Instruments,72 the Sixth Circuit stated that "[t] his language
suggests that only the failure to complete and submit the required
forms can provide the basis for a citizen suit . . . . The form is
completed and filed even when it is not timely filed. ' 73 The Sixth
Circuit also found the language differences between CWA and EP-
CRA to be unpersuasive and "hypertechnical." 74 In relying on
70. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1245; United Musica4 61 F.3d at 478. The Seventh
Circuit stated, " [ t] his scenario [of not permitting suits for wholly past violations] is
impossible to reconcile with the clearly expressed intent of Congress, or with the
very existence of the citizen enforcement provision." Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1245. The
Sixth Circuit, however, explained that "the plain language and structure of EPCRA
lead us to conclude that citizen plaintiffs may not bring actions that seek civil pen-
alties for purely historical violations." United Musical, 61 F.3d at 478.
Additionally, Steel Company, in its brief, asserted that "[n]othing is gained by
such a suit [for wholly past violations] (with the exception of the citizen group
possibly recovering attorneys' fees). A party's resources will be consumed defend-
ing an unnecessary lawsuit - resources that could be used to invest in new plants
and equipment, creating jobs and benefiting [sic] the community." Petitioner's
Brief at 47-48, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96-
643).
71. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1240-44; United Musica4 61 F.3d at 474-77 (both
analyzing language of EPCRA). See generally Lohmann, supra note 11, at 1724-35
(examining language use in EPCRA in critically analyzing split in holdings be-
tween Sixth and Seventh Circuits); Abate, supra note 45, at 8-27 (reviewing
Gwaltney decision and its applicability to other environmental statutes, and analyz-
ing language differences between CWA and other environmental statutes).
72. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
73. Id. at 475. In comparing the "alleged to be in violation of" language of
CWA and the "failure to" language of EPCRA, the Sixth Circuit asserted, "[wie
reject this rather hypertechnical parsing of the language of the statutes in favor of
the most natural reading of EPCRA, which weighs against allowing citizen suits for
purely historical violations." Id. at 477. One commentator noted that prior to the
Sixth Circuit's decision, courts which had reviewed the Gwaltney decision in EP-
CRA citizen suits rejected its holding. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 36. The
commentator stated, "[n]onetheless, the Sixth Circuit chose to ignore relevant
precedent, congressional intent, and EPCRA's plain language in the course of
striking a critical blow to the public's right-to-know about chemical hazards." Id.
74. United Musical, 61 F.3d at 476-77. See also Bber, supra note 7, at 1624-31
(reviewing possible shortcomings in Sixth Circuit's analysis in United Musical).
This commentator stated:
In [concluding that the language differences between CWA and EPCRA
were insignificant], the Sixth Circuit contradicted the first half of its argu-
ment, in which it examined the language of the citizen suit provision
closely in order to determine whether EPCRA allowed suits for past viola-
tions. It seems that the Sixth Circuit agreed with the result in Gwaltney
and wanted a similar result in United Musical Instruments. Thus, it simply
quoted the argument and glossed over the holes.
Id. at 1624 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. X: p. 127
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Gwaltney, the Sixth Circuit commented that Congress could have
expressly stated its intent for timeliness. 75 Congress chose not to do
this and, instead, limited the power of citizens to bring suits under
EPCRA as compared to the broad power given to EPA.76
In Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., 77 the Seventh Cir-
cuit explained that it did not find the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
persuasive because that court appeared to overlook some key dis-
tinctions between CWA and EPCRA. 78 The Seventh Circuit found
the language difference between the two statutes significant, assert-
ing, "[t]he language of EPCRA contains no temporal limitation;
'failure to do' something can indicate a failure past or present. '79
In addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that EPCRA does not perva-
sively use present tense language while CWA does.80 The use of the
word "under" implies that reporting is to be done in accordance
75. See United Musical 61 F.3d at 475-76.
76. See id. at 475. Expanding upon the absence of explicit congressional in-
tent, Steel Company noted in its brief that:
[i]n the absence of a contrary congressional intent, Congress should not
be presumed to have made a substantial change from its customary citi-
zen suit model. A statute conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts
should also be strictly construed, and any doubts resolved against jurisdic-
tion. Here there are serious doubts that Congress intended citizens to
sue for past EPCRA violations, and all citizen plaintiffs can highlight is a
slight difference in language and attempt to stretch that difference into
federal jurisdiction.
Petitioner's Brief at 12, Steel Co. (No. 96-643).
77. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996).
78. See id. at 1243. One commentator noted that "[t]he absence of specific
timing requirements within the citizen-suit provision has perplexed courts" and
determining whether these timing requirements exist greatly influences the possi-
bility of bringing citizen suits for wholly past violations. Lohmann, supra note 11,
at 1710-11. This commentator further stated, "if companies need only complete
the required forms prior to the filing of a suit, the citizen-suit provision is mean-
ingless and gives no incentive for the Davids [referring to the story of David and
Goliath] of the environmental arena to initiate enforcement proceedings." Id. at
1711.
79. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243. The Seventh Circuit explained that the plain
language reading of different language in different statutes requires the import of
different meaning, recognizing that the selection of different words by Congress is
significant to the overall meaning and interpretation of the statute. See id. at 1243-
44. Linguistical interpretations are also important in determining standing, which
is a constitutional requirement, even though "a plaintiffs satisfaction of the consti-
tutional requirement often depends more particularly upon interpretation of the
statutory framework in which the complaint arises." June, supra note 11, at 771.
80. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243-44. The Seventh Circuit stated:
The plain language of the EPCRA citizen enforcement provision does not
point clearly to the present tense as its counterpart does in the Clean
Water Act. In fact, it does the opposite. The language of EPCRA contains no
temporal limitation; "failure to do" something can indicate a failure past or
present.
Id. at 1243 (emphasis added).
17
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with the requirements of the section of which it is "under."81 The
Seventh Circuit stated that "[w] e read the provision as authorizing
citizen suits not only for failure to complete and submit forms, but
for failure to complete and submit forms in accordance with the
requirements set forth in the referenced sections." 82
While interpretations vary, the Seventh Circuit presented
strong policy arguments in Citizens that support its interpretation of
the relevant statutory language. The Seventh Circuit explained that
if citizens are not allowed to sue for past violations, their subse-
quent inability to recover the costs of their efforts, including investi-
gation and litigation, would lower their likelihood to be proactive. 83
Additionally, in its brief to the Supreme Court, Citizens noted that Congress
did not envision use of only government enforcement of EPCRA. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 21-22, Steel Co. (No. 96-643). Citizens stated that Congress:
envisioned an important role for citizen suits. As we have explained, such
a role is consistent with Gwaltney. But Congress could not have intended
the carefully-designed citizen suit provision of EPCRA to be set at naught
by firms that take the simple expedient of filing once their violations of
EPCRA are discovered.
Id.
81. Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243 (explaining that use of "under" provides refer-
ence to statute's requirements without having to list them again).
82. Id. The Seventh Circuit explicitly stated, "[these [timeliness require-
ments] are not guidelines or suggestions; they are essential elements of the provi-
sions citizens have authority to enforce." Id. (footnote omitted). To ignore these
timeliness requirements "would render gratuitous the compliance dates for initial
submissions" as EPCRA sets forth. Id. (citing Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 750). See
generally, Keithline, supra note 60, at 1254-58 (emphasizing that since EPCRA is
informational statute, receiving information in timely manner is key aspect of fully
implementing purpose of EPCRA).
83. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. In concluding, the Seventh Circuit com-
mented, "[p]ut simply, if citizens can't sue, they can't recover the costs of their
efforts." Id. According to EPCRA, "[t]he court, in issuing any final order in any
action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or the substantially
prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." EP-
CRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f). SeeArmstrong et al., Courts Split on Citizen Suits for
Past Violations of EPCRA, KANSAS-IowA ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Oct., 1996 (ex-
plaining Seventh Circuit's support of EPCRA's policy basis as "if alleged violators
could avoid a lawsuit simply by submitting late forms, citizens could not use the
lawsuit to recover their legal fees to compensate for the time and effort put into
discovering the violations. This would be a disincentive to citizen suits and there-
fore contrary to one of the purposes of EPCRA.").
In reviewing the historical development of citizen suits, one commentator ex-
plained that because CAA serves as the model for citizen suit provisions, its legisla-
tive history is relevant to interpretation of EPCRA. See Keithline, supra note 60, at
1232-41 (providing chronicle of citizen suits under environmental statutes). In
considering amendments to CAA, the Senate understood that:
[c]itizen enforcement concerned industry executives because the execu-
tives thought it would lead to frivolous and harassing lawsuits. Although
urged by industry groups to eliminate the citizen suit provision, the Sen-
ate Committee did not yield to this pressure. The Senate Committee was
aware of concern in the courts that citizen enforcement of legislation
18
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In debates prior to the enactment of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986. (SARA)84 of which EPCRA is a
part, Representative Dingell stated that failure to sign this bill
would be like "playing chicken with the health of the American
public. Signing this bill, however, will be an opportunity to im-
prove the otherwise dismal environmental record the administra-
tion has compiled. ' 85 Additionally, the Citizens court justified the
sixty-day notice requirement by explaining that each day of a viola-
tion is considered a separate violation subject to penalty.8 6 There-
fore, by giving notice, the alleged violator may bring itself into
compliance with EPCRA and thereby reduce the amount of penalty
fees assessed against it.87
would overload the dockets, but it encouraged courts to endorse citizen
participation in protection of the environment.
Id. at 1235.
84. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994)) [hereinafter SARA].
85. 132 CONG. Rc. H9561 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Dingell). While EPCRA is part of SARA, EPCRA generally stands as a law onto
itself. See Steven J. Christiansen & Stephen H. Urquhart, The Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act of 1986: Analysis and Update, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 235,
236 (1992) (analyzing relationship between EPCRA and SARA) (citing EPCRA
§ 321, 42 U.S.C. § 11041).
86. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. According to EPCRA, civil and administrative
penalties are as follows:
(1) Any person . . . who violates any requirement of section 11022 or
11023 of this title shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in
an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each such violation.
(2) Any person . . . who violates any requirement of section 11021 or
11043(b) of this title, and any person who fails to furnish to the Adminis-
trator information required under section 11042(a) (2) of this title shall
be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in an amount not to ex-
ceed $10,000 for each such violation.
(3) Each day a violation described in paragraph (1) or (2) continues
shall, for purposes of this subsection, constitute a separate violation.
EPCRA § 325 (c), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c).
87. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. In reviewing the usefulness of penalties, even
if such penalties are paid to the U.S. Treasury instead of the plaintiff, environmen-
talists believe these penalties still have a deterrent effect. See Amicus Brief of the
National Resources Defense Council, Inc., at 18-19, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643). The Amici noted: "[i]f citizens cannot
seek civil penalties for past violations, the deterrent effect of citizen suits and pen-
alties for violations of EPCRA in their communities will be eviscerated. As a result,
citizens will be exposed to the risk of increased pollution." Id. at 18. In reviewing
legislative history, the Amici concluded, "Congress has [ ] decided that civil penal-
ties are causally related to deterrence. With civil penalties in citizen suits, violators
are more likely to comply with the law." Id. at 22.
19
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3. Lower Court Precedent: A Unanimous "Yes" to Citizen Suits for
Wholly Past Violations under EPCRA
Several district courts also have considered the issue of
whether citizens may sue for wholly past violations of EPCRA.s8 In
any given case, the series of events unfolds as follows: the defendant
violates EPCRA; the plaintiff gives notice of intent to sue; the de-
fendant files the documents or performs any necessary action for
compliance; and the plaintiff files suit.89 In reviewing the purpose
and the language of EPCRA, all of the district courts addressing this
issue determined that the Act permits citizen suits for wholly past
violations.9 0
The District Court for the Western District of New York as-
serted, "[t]he plain language of EPCRA's reporting, enforcement
and civil penalty provisions, when logically viewed together, compel a
conclusion that EPCRA confers federal jurisdiction over citizen law-
suits for past violations." 91 In addition, the Idaho District Court
commented, "EPCRA's citizen suit provision .... by its terms does
not restrict citizen suits to cases alleging ongoing violations.
Rather, it authorizes such suits for 'failure to do' certain things, spe-
cifically, failure to '[c]omplete and submit' the required forms." 9 2
88. See Don't Waste Ariz., Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972 (D.
Ariz. 1997); Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 690 (D.
Idaho 1996); Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Williams v. Leybold Tech., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal.
1992); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No. CIV-90-
11105, 1991 WL 183772 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (all
examining role of citizen suits for wholly past violations in effectuating purpose
and policy of EPCRA).
89. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 972-74; Computrol, 952 F. Supp. at 691;
Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1135-36; Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 765-67; Buffalo
Envelope Co., 1991 WL 183772, at *3; Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 746, 748-49 (all dem-
onstrating that essentially, defendant is in compliance with EPCRA by time suit is
formally filed, thus eliminating any active violation).
90. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 981; Computrol, 952 F. Supp. at 692-93;
Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1141; Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 767-68; Buffalo Envel-
ope Co., 1991 WL 183772, at *2-*8; Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 749-53 (all concluding
that policy and purpose of EPCRA is furthered by permitting suits for wholly past
violations).
91. Buffalo Envelope Co., 1991 WL 183772, at *4; Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 750
(emphasis added) (quotation used in both case opinions). The word "compel" is
typically defined as a certain amount of force or a mandate to act in a specified
manner. SeeWEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIcrIoNARY 370 (2d ed. 1983)
(defining compel as "to drive or urge with force, or irresistibly; to constrain; to
oblige; to necessitate, either by physical or moral force").
92. Computrol, 952 F. Supp. at 692 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)). Highlighting failure to act in a
timely manner as legitimate grounds for a citizen suit, the District Court for the
Northern District of California explained that "Itihe statute does not expressly
20
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Agreeing with the other district courts, the Idaho District Court
concluded that, "[u]nder the plain language of the statute, the
Court believes it is at least 'reasonably clear' that EPCRA authorizes
citizen suits for wholly past, not just ongoing, violations of the
statute."9
3
These courts also compared the language of CWA and EPCRA,
recognizing that the use of different language implores the court to
import different meanings. The District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania held that "[t]he statutory language of the EP-
CRA and the Clean Water Act differ. ... [therefore] [c] itizen suits
can be brought for past failures to comply with the EPCRA even if
the defendant is in compliance with the Act at the time the com-
plaint is filed [whereas CWA does not permit this type of suit]. 94
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Manu-
require a continuing violation at the time of filing suit, but rather authorizes a suit
against any person who failed to submit an MSDS [Material Safety Data Sheets] by
the applicable deadline." Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 768.
In Don't Waste Arizona, the court asserted that "the most natural reading of the
EPCRA citizen suit provision is to require that reports be submitted in a timely
manner. Failure to submit reports in a timely manner, then, would be a basis for a
suit alleging failure to comply with the EPCRA's reporting requirements." 950 F.
Supp. at 979. In concluding that such suits are permissible, the Arizona District
Court referred to the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Citizens and stated,
"[a] nalysis of the plain language of the statute and the policies driving the enact-
ment of the EPCRA compels the conclusion that the Citizens court has embraced
the better reasoned approach to statutory construction." Id. at 976.
In discussing federal environmental legislation, one commentator noted that
"the Seventh Circuit in Steel Company offers a thorough and accurate analysis of
how the EPCRA citizen suit provision is analytically distinct from the Clean Water
Act's provision and how EPCRA's citizen suit provision must therefore be inter-
preted to authorize suits for wholly past violations of the Act." Abate, supra note
45, at 27. Further, without investigations and suits to force compliance, "the peo-
ple of communities whom the statute is designed to protect and inform, and the
public agencies that are charged with providing the information, would be de-
prived of the information indefinitely." Id. at 26-27.
For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Citizens, see supra notes 77-
87 and accompanying text.
93. Computrol, 952 F. Supp. at 692-93.
94. Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1141. In this suit between non-profit
groups and a manufacturing plant for violations of EPCRA, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed constitutional claims concerning
separation of powers and standing. See id. at 1132. The court held that citizen
suits for wholly past violations are constitutional as "citizen suits are not an unlaw-
ful delegation of executive power, since Congress in enacting the EPCRA did not
grant to a person or persons under its control executive power." Id. at 1138. Also,
the court identified types of injuries that are redressable, indicating that the plain-
tiffs had fulfilled the requirements for standing. See id. at 1139-41.
In exploring standing under environmental statutes, one commentator
asserted:
[T] he validity of an aesthetic injury is assumed under environmental stat-
utes, and economic injuries may carry a jurisprudential presumption of
invalidity if the interests asserted are not properly aligned with the inter-
21
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facturing,95 the District Court of the Western District of New York
clarified that the verb tenses used in the two Acts indicate signifi-
cant differences, with CWA using mainly present tense verbs and
EPCRA lacking this "pervasive use of present tense. "96 In Don't
Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc.,97 the Arizona District Court
accepted the plaintiff's argument that the use of "under" in the EP-
CRA provision authorizing citizen suits for failure to comply with
reporting requirements means "in accordance with," thus recogniz-
ing a timeliness element.98 Additionally, the __ held that stat-
ests of the protected resource. If this standard is maintained, the thresh-
old inquiry of standing may soon resemble a precipice.
June, supra note 11, at 787 (citing Pacific Northwest Generating Coop v. Brown,
822 F. Supp. 1479, 1501-06 (D. Or. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-35531 (9th Cir.
May 25, 1993)).
95. 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). In Whiting, the plaintiff was an envi-
ronmental activist group known for pursuing environmental enforcement suits.
See Wes Hills, Lawsuit Seeks County Fine: Group Says Lead Dumped, DAYrON DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 19, 1995, at 2B. One writer articulated, "[e]nvironmentals love what he
[Richard Smith, an environmental lawyer for Atlantic States Legal Foundation]
came up with, but some companies are crying blackmail at the version of environ-
mental policing Smith is practicing on behalf of an East Coast environmental foun-
dation." Leslie Holdcroft, In Defense of the Environment: Young Attorney Sues Firms
Violating Pollution Standards, but Critics Call It Blackmail, NEWS TRJB., (Tacoma), Apr.
8, 1994, at Al. In Whiting, this organization brought suit against an industrial facil-
ity for failure to submit information in a timely manner according to the require-
ments of EPCRA. See Whiting 772 F. Supp. at 745. By the time the plaintiff had
filed suit, the defendant had come into compliance with EPCRA and moved to
dismiss the suit. See id. at 746.
96. Id. at 752-53. The district court emphasized that EPCRA focuses on the
"failure to" act whereas CWA focuses on owners and operators who are "alleged to
be in violation of" the act. Id. at 752. The district court commented, "unlike § 505
of the Clean Water Act, EPCRA § 326 does not contain 'pervasive use of the pres-
ent tense . . .' which might indicate [EPCRA's] restricted applicability to continu-
ing or intermittent violations." Id. at 753. In another case, the district court
explained that "[t] he natural reading of the EPCRA provision at least would seem
to include past acts of noncompliance, while a natural reading of the Clean Water
Act provision, as the Supreme Court has held, indicates that the statute contem-
plates only prospective relief." Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envel-
ope Co., No. CIV-90-1110S, 1991 WL 183772, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991).
Reviewing the floodgate argument, petitioner in Steel Co. charged that if suits
for wholly past violations are permitted,
the federal courts will experience a deluge of EPCRA citizen suits, con-
trary to Congress's concern that the federal courts not be flooded with
unnecessary citizen actions. Not only will citizen groups be able to sue if
a company, like Petitioner, achieves compliance within the notice period,
but a citizen group will also be able to search old government records to
determine which companies filed late EPCRA reports and then sue.
Petitioner's Brief at 46-47, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003
(1998) (No. 96-643).
97. 950 F. Supp. 972 (D. Ariz. 1997).
98. Id. at 978. The court reiterated the Citizens Court finding that:
[t]he plain language of the EPCRA citizen enforcement provision does
not point clearly to the present tense as its counterpart does in the Clean
22
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utes which are remedial in nature, such as EPCRA, are to be
construed broadly.99 Allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations
of EPCRA, therefore, would be consistent with a broad
construction. 100
The district courts also surveyed other environmental legisla-
tion in determining that citizen suits for wholly past violations of
EPCRA are permissible.lu Specifically, in reviewing the 1990
amendment to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the district courts ex-
plained that Congress had explicitly stated that citizen suits for
wholly past violations of CAA are permissible, provided that the first
violation was not an isolated occurrence.1 0 2 Since Congress did not
amend EPCRA, the Arizona District Court opined that "Congress
did not need to amend the language of the EPCRA's citizen suit
provision because that language already authorized citizen suits for
wholly past violations." 10 3 Accordingly, CWA and EPCRA can be
Water Act. In fact, it does the opposite. The language of EPCRA con-
tains no temporal limitation; "failure to do" something can indicate a fail-
ure past or present.
Id. at 975 (citing Citizens, 90 F. 3d at 1243) (emphasis added). The district court
recognized that noncompliance is generally not cured by the time that many a.-
leged violators receive notice of intent to sue. See id. at 978. Therefore, the court
reasoned, "[t]he venue provision ... uses the past tense because it contemplates
that the alleged violator may have come into compliance between the time the
plaintiff files a notice of intent to sue and the time the plaintiff actually files suit."
Id.
99. See id. at 977.
100. See id. (citing Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 881
F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1989)). Further, the Arizona District Court's analysis of
statutory construction began with the recognition of two key rules of statutory in-
terpretation: (1) the court must start with the statute's plain language; and (2) if
the language is "plain and unambiguous on its face, 'the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'" Id. at 976-77 (citing Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916); United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896,
898 (9th Cir. 1990)).
101. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 975-76, 978-79; 1991 WL 183772, at
*7. For a review of the statutory foundations supporting EPCRA, see supra notes
40-52 and accompanying text. See generally, June, supra note 11, at 767-99 (discuss-
ing standing under various environmental statutes).
102. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 976 (discussing wholly past violation
of CAA). See also Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No.
CIV-90-1110S, 1991 WL 183772, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991) (comparing lan-
guage of relevant environmental acts). The Arizona District Court recognized,
based on President George Bush's statements, that the 1990 amendment to CAA
addressed the Gwaltney decision. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 976. Presi-
dent Bush noted "'that in providing for citizen suits for civil penalties, the Con-
gress has codified the Supreme Court's interpretation of such provisions in the
Gwaltney case. As the Constitution requires, litigants must show, at a minimum,
intermittent, rather than purely past violations of the statute in order to bring
suit.'" Id. (quoting 26 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1824, Nov.
19, 1990).
103. Id.
23
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distinguished, logically permitting the conclusion that although EP-
CRA does not require active violations in order to maintain a citi-
zen suit, CWA does require such violations. 10 4
Several district courts also addressed the issue of standing. The
elements of standing, as the Supreme Court established in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., are: "(1) an injury in
fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defend-
ant's conduct or omissions; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision."10 5
Lack of timely filing causes first a loss of information, then an
inability to conduct research and develop appropriate guidelines
and, finally, an injury. 106 This injury fulfills the injury in fact re-
quirement of the first prong. One district court expounded on the
requisite type of injury by asserting that "'[a]llegations of injury to
an organization's ability to disseminate information may be
deemed sufficiently particular for standing purposes where that in-
formation is essential to the injured organization's activities, and
where the lack of the information will render those activities infeasi-
ble."107 A causal connection, in fulfillment of the second prong,
also exists because the alleged violator's failure to timely submit in-
formation EPCRA requires can be directly traced to the citizen's
lack of information. 10 8
Redressability, the prong which the Supreme Court found to
be problematic, can be fulfilled by the plaintiff either obtaining a
declaratory judgment or injunctive relief.10 9 Additionally, the court
104. See generally B6er, supra note 7, at 1622-26 (examining statutory language
of CWA and EPCRA). This author explained that "there appears to be a mix of
present, past, and ambiguous tenses within the citizen suit provision of EPCRA.
Thus, the pervasive use of the present tense relied on so heavily in Gwaltney does
not exist in EPCRA." Id. at 1626.
105. Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 980 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
106. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
1132, 1139-40 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (articulating that "[p]ersons experiencing such a
loss of information may be found to have suffered a concrete and particularized
invasion of their legally-protected interests"); see also Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp.
at 980 (explaining that plaintiffs injury arose out of his inability to complete his
"investigative and reporting" projects due to defendant's lack of timely filing of
reports EPCRA required).
107. Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1140 (quoting Competitive Enter. Inst. v.
NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
108. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 980; Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at
1140 (both tracing causal link between lack of information and injury back to com-
pany which failed to timely report statutorily-required information).
109. See Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
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may order the defendant to pay a civil penalty and/or the plaintiffs'
"costs of litigation" in order to deter future violations.110 The court
may further order the defendant to refrain from any future viola-
tions of EPCRA. 1II "If successful, the plaintiffs' injuries may be redressed
by either declaratory judgment, fining the defendant or enjoining it from
committing future violations."' 12 These remedies coincide with envi-
ronmental groups' goals of improving the overall environment and
providing the public with information and education. 1 3 Although
the Supreme Court may believe otherwise, according to these dis-
trict courts, the standing requirement can and has been met when
plaintiffs sue for wholly past violations under EPCRA's citizen suit
provision.
Additionally, the district courts have relied on the notice provi-
sion of EPCRA in determining that the Act permits citizens to sue
for wholly past violations." 4 In reviewing CWA, the Supreme Court
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
113. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 980-81 (identifying both conditions
for individual and representational standing as well as manner in which plaintiff
has fulfilled requirements in both domains). The defendant in Don't Waste Arizona
also challenged whether the Arizona District Court had jurisdiction over this mat-
ter and whether the plaintiff had standing to maintain an action against the de-
fendant. See id. at 973. In concluding that it had jurisdiction because a citizen suit
for wholly past violations is permissible, the district court gave effect to the reme-
dial purposes of the statute. See id. at 977. The court found that EPCRA "grants
the district court the power to enforce a requirement and to impose civil penalties
.... It does not limit the district court to exercising its power only when it will
exercise its full range of power." Id. at 977. Further, the court explained that since
a member of Don't Waste Arizona attempted to complete investigative and report-
ing projects, but was unable to do so because of McLane Foods' failure to fulfill its
reporting requirements, the organization had standing under the premise of rep-
resentational standing. See id. at 980.
In reviewing representational standing, one commentator recognized the use
of alignment of interests and stated that "because 'the doctrine of associational
standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to
create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others....
[tihe only practical judicial policy ... often is to permit the association ... in a
single action to vindicate the interests of all.'" June, supra note 11, at 790 (first
omission added) (citations omitted).
114. See Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 690, 694
(D. Idaho 1996); Delaware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1141; Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No. CIV-90-1110S, 1991 WL 183772, at *7 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg.,
772 F. Supp. 745, 752 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (all examining notice provision as part of
analysis in determining suits for wholly past violations are permissible); see also
Lohmann, supra note 11, at 1710-13 (examining notice provision of EPCRA and
explaining uses for provision other than allowing defendant time to come into
compliance). By providing notice, the defendant can both limit its noncompli-
ance time and potential fines as well as clarify any mistaken information. See Loh-
mann, supra note 11, at 1711.
25
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explained that the notice requirement in CWA is designed "to give
the alleged violator an opportunity to bring itself into complete
compliance with the Act and thus make a citizen suit unneces-
sary."115 A comparison of EPCRA, CWA and the amended version
of CAA, however, weakens this argument. Congress amended CAA
to permit citizens to sue for wholly past violations, but left the no-
tice requirement intact.116 This congressional action rebuts the
Supreme Court's position in Gwaltney, in which it held that Con-
gress would not include a notice provision within the same statute
designed to permit citizen suits for wholly past violations.11 7 Fur-
ther, the notice requirement allows the parties to negotiate a settle-
ment rather than proceed with litigation.' 18
The purpose of EPCRA is to inform citizens about toxic chemi-
cals in their communities so that they can be prepared to respond
115. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484
U.S. 49, 50 (1987). EPCRA contains a notice requirement similar to that of CWA.
Compare EPCRA § 326(d), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d) (1997) with CWA § 505(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994).
In Whiting, the Amici explained in their brief that "the sixty days notice provi-
sions served three purposes: (1) to give the alleged violator notice and enable him
to verify or contest the citizen's allegations; (2) encourage a violator to mitigate its
violations by taking corrective actions; and (3) enable parties to discuss the alleged
violation and negotiate a settlement." Smith, supra note 42, at 1069 (citing Memo-
randum of Amici Curiae at 10-11, Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp. (No. CIV-90-
1109S)).
116. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244 (noting that "[i]n 1990 Congress amended
the Clean Air Act to permit citizen enforcement actions for past violations, yet left
the notice provision intact").
117. See Buffalo Envelope, 1991 WL 183772, at *7; Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 753
(court provided same reasoning in both cases in examining notice provision). The
District Court for the Western District of New York stated:
Therefore, the fact that Congress amended the Clean Air Act citizen suit
provision to allow suits for past violations while simultaneously leaving the
Clean Air Act's notice provision unchanged undercuts the importance of
the Supreme Court's discussion in Gwaltney that Congress would not have
placed such a notice provision in a statute where it also intended [to]
authorize citizen suits for past violations.
Buffalo Envelope, 1991 WL 183772, at *7; Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 753; see also Dela-
ware Valley, 813 F. Supp. at 1141 (explaining that statute can have internal consis-
tency with both notice provision and provision for suits for wholly past violations);
CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (explaining in section entitled "amendments" that
Congress changed Act to allow suits for wholly past violations, but did not alter
notice provision).
118. See Computrol 952 F. Supp. at 694-95. A settlement is not only a time
saving device, but more cost effective than litigation. See Margaret C. Liu, From
Information to Action: Right-To-Know Laws in the European Community, 1991-92 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 335, 34546 (1992) (explaining that as means of promoting reduction in
use of hazardous waste, EPA "has entered into consent decrees with companies,
reducing fines where firms agree to implement new technologies or to replace
chemicals currently in use with less toxic substances").
[Vol. X: p. 127
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to any potential emergency. 119 An essential first step in compiling
this information is having owners and operators report such infor-
mation in a timely manner.120 Without accurate and timely infor-
mation, community planning boards are greatly hampered in their
efforts to plan adequate response measures. 12 1 In Whiting, the
court commented " [i]f owners or operators fail to comply with the
reporting requirements, including the mandatory compliance
dates, the development and success of emergency response plans
would be seriously, if not critically, undercut, and the entire thrust
of EPCRA could be defeated."1 22 The district court in Don't Waste
Arizona concluded that "[i] f the citizen suit is barred by the alleged
violator's coming into compliance, then a facility has every incen-
tive to wait and see if it is caught before spending the money to
119. See EPCRA, Pub. L. No. 99499, § 11001 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3374. The legislative history explains that
[t]he Senate amendment and the House amendment both establish pro-
grams to provide the public with important information on the hazard-
ous chemicals in their communities, and to establish emergency planning
and notification requirements which would protect the public in the
event of a release of hazardous chemicals .... The conference substitute
adopts the House approach with respect to establishing the programs as a
free-standing provision of law and incorporates substantive provisions
from both House and Senate amendments.
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374, 3374. In response to the disasters in Bhopal, India, and
Institute, West Virginia, many pieces of legislation were proposed, but it was only
this community-right-to-know amendment to the Superfund reauthorization bill
that made enough headway to become a law. See Newsfront Bhopa4 supra note 1, at
14.
120. See Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 751. One commentator suggested that the
legislative history of EPCRA emphasizes the importance of providing information
to the public as well as recognized that as information is collected, it should be
disseminated to the public. See Smith, supra note 42, at 1058 (analyzing necessity
of public awareness of potential environmental problems).
121. See Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 751. "Either the failure to report or late
reporting can cause incomplete plans to be formulated, which endanger the pub-
lic and emergency workers." Smith, supra note 42, at 1071. Also, by not recogniz-
ing the timeliness requirements, the compliance dates become meaningless and
then "the public [has] no recourse against violators who endanger the safety of the
community." Id. (citing Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 752).
As previously stated, communities cannot plan adequately for emergencies if
they do not have accurate and timely information. Such lack of planning in turn
defeats the statutory purpose of EPCRA. For a discussion of the purpose of EP-
CRA, see infra notes 137-62 and accompanying text.
122. Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 751. A consent decree was part of the settlement
in Whiting. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 34. In reviewing the difference in pen-
alty amounts and the cost of a pollution reduction program, the District Court for
the Western District of New York concluded that together, these two items created
a fair remedy. See id. Further, "[i]n so ruling, the court strongly suggested that
citizen suits promoting pollution prevention - and other supplemental environ-
mental projects (SEP) which go beyond EPCRA's statutory requirements - can
play an important role in furthering EPCRA's purposes." Id.
27
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generate and submit the required reports."1 23 Given EPA's limited
budget, citizen groups need to supplement the work of EPA by
bringing suits on their own in order to encourage compliance
within the regulated community.124
IV. UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING EPCRA
A. Language Is the Initial Indicator of the Purpose of a Law
Language is the first source in understanding and interpreting
a statute. 125 The key difference between EPCRA and CWA is in
their sections providing for citizen suits: while CWA applies to oper-
ators/owners who are "alleged to be in violation of [the Act] ," EP-
CRA applies to operators/owners who "fail[ed] to do [the
mandatory reporting] .,126 To be in violation of an act, one must be
currently engaging in a proscribed activity, whereas "failure to per-
form" a certain act can occur at any time, whether past, present or
future.12 7 The notice provision of EPCRA uses the present tense
123. Don't Waste Ariz., Inc., v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972, 979 (D.
Ariz. 1997) (citing Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th
Cir. 1996)). The court continued, "EPA's resources are severely limited, and the
purpose of allowing the citizen suit is to permit the citizen to take enforcement
action where the EPA Administrator has determined that its resources would best
be applied elsewhere." Id.
124. See id. at 979 (explaining that since citizens can pursue only those actions
that EPA is not actively pursuing, "only if the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for
wholly past violations can the citizen suit provision effectively supplement the
EPA's role in enforcing compliance").
125. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elemen-
tary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.").
126. Compare CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994) with EPCRA
§ 326(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (1) (1996).
127. See Don't Waste Ariz., 950 F. Supp. at 975-76 (explaining language differ-
ences). The district court explained that:
the "occurs" language in the notice provision is consistent with the con-
clusion that the statute allows citizens to sue for wholly past violations. In
most cases, the alleged violator has not cured her noncompliance at the
time a plaintiff issues a notice of intent to sue letter. The venue provi-
sion, by contrast, uses the past tense because it contemplates that the al-
leged violator may have come into compliance between the time the
plaintiff files a notice of intent to sue and the time the plaintiff actually
files suit.
Id. at 978.
If Congress designed the notice provision strictly to allow violators to come
into compliance with EPCRA, "nothing in the citizen suit provisions prevents a
defendant from filing past-due reports when it receives a notice of intent to sue,
then simply ignoring EPCRA until it receives another such notice." Respondent's
Brief at 21, Steel Co. v. Citizvensfor a BetterEnv't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643).
Hence, a cycle of noncompliance is created whereby certain companies only file
[Vol. X: p. 127
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verb "occurs" and' the venue provision uses the past tense verb "oc-
curred." 12 8 "The most reasonable inference from this contrast is
that the violation must be ongoing at the time notice is given, but
need not be ongoing at the time suit is brought. '129
the required reports when potential plaintiffs threaten them with litigation. See id.
This cycle contravenes the purposes of EPCRA. For a discussion of the statutory
development of EPCRA, see supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
Also, unlike CWA, EPCRA does not require permanent changes to a company,
such as purchasing new equipment to reduce pollution. See Respondent's Brief at
21, Steel Co. (No. 96-643). Therefore, once a company remedies an alleged viola-
tion, it may easily begin to violate EPCRA once again. See id.
In its letter of notice of intent to sue, Don't Waste Arizona recognized that a
historic habit of noncompliance is likely to continue unless some intervening
force, namely litigation, creates a change in behavior. See Letter from M. David
Karnas, Attorney for Don't Waste Arizona, to Grady Rosier, CEO for McLane Com-
pany, Inc., et al. (Apr. 28, 1995). The letter stated:
The violations of EPCRA are continuous and ongoing and there is reason
to believe these violations will continue in the future. Because of the his-
toric and consistent pattern of non-compliance at the McLane Company,
Inc. facility, DWA will request equitable relief and penalties of $25,000
per day per violation from the required dates of submittal. DWA will also
request an award of costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of this
litigation.
Id.
Learning theory holds that the probability of any given behavior (i.e., compli-
ance) is based on the consequences of that behavior (i.e., litigation). See Michael
Nietzel et al., Introduction to Clinical Psychology 278-79 (3d ed. 1991). If a given
behavior (i.e., compliance) is closely associated with the removal of something
negative (i.e., litigation), then the likelihood of that behavior occurring increase,
otherwise known as negative reinforcement. See id. at 279.
128. See EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046. The notice provision states that
"[n]o action may be commenced under subsection (a) (1) (A) of this section prior
to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the Admin-
istrator, the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator."
Id. § 326(d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (d)(1) (emphasis added).
The venue provision states that "[a) ny action under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion against an owner or operator of a facility shall be brought in the district court
for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." Id. § 326(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 11046 (b) (1) (emphasis added).
129. Respondent's Brief at 16, Steel Co. (No. 96-643). An amicus brief filed in
this case stated, "[t]he legislative history also indicates a [c]ongressional intent to
enforce strictly the deadlines delineated in the statute. Reporting must be 'swift
and complete' and the requirements of the statute 'must be strictly and strenu-
ously enforced.'" Brief of Amici Curiae by the States of New York, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and the Territory of
Guam, at 13, Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (quoting 132 CONG. REc. H9593 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Sikorski)).
Petitioner in Steel Co. asserted, "It]he goal of the citizen group is achieved with
compliance, even though at a small cost for posting the notice." Petitioner's Brief
at 45, Steel Co. (No. 96-643). Petitioner justified this position by stating:
Because of EPCRA's complexity, companies that receive an EPCRA no-
tice letter may not be able to easily comply and submit the required forms
with the 60-day notice period. To those companies, including The Steel
Company, whose regulatory burden is great and whose resolve to cure a
29
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Moreover, Congress selects language for statutes which reflects
its intent.130 It is illogical for Congress to provide the remedy of a
citizen suit, and then prohibit bringing such a suit for violations of
the Act.131 As one environmental group noted:
Had Congress wanted to limit citizen suits under EPCRA
.... Congress could simply have borrowed the phrase "al-
violation is strong, Congress offers an opportunity to come into compli-
ance during the 60-day period, thus avoiding a citizen suit and leaving to
EPA's "broad perspective" whether enforcement is truly necessary. This
makes EPCRA no different from other environmental statutes where, if a
violation is cured within 60 days, citizen enforcement is barred. More-
over, should a company simply "throw" reports together after receiving a
citizen notice of intent to sue, it opens itself up to a wide range of civil
and criminal penalties.
Id. at 43-44.
130. See Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good
Judging Under a Textualist Lens, 72 IND. LJ. 1133, 1151-52 (1997) (explaining use of
language to reflect intent). The author identified some potential problems with
attempting to infer intent from the language of the statute by noting the existence
of an assumption "that Congress has the ordinary meaning in mind when it votes
on the words of a statute .... [Establishing objective intent] also means that
Congress conscientiously and studiously respects the rules of grammar during the
drafting process. Moreover, it depends on the notion that there is a shared ordi-
nary meaning." Id. (citations omitted). The author next suggests that Congress'
failure to focus on the relationship between laws and their effect on each other
further complicated attempts to infer intent from statutory language. The author
concluded that the judiciary, not Congress, should focus on this relationship. See
id. at 1152.
131. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n.,
453 U.S. 1, 2 (1981) (interpreting remedy provisions of other environmental laws
and stating that "[in the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional
intent, it must be concluded that Congress provided precisely the remedies it con-
sidered appropriate.").
Additionally, Congress created EPCRA as part of SARA and established within
SARA provisions for citizen suits under each of EPCRA and the Superfund law. See
Sharelson, supra note 46, at 37. Interestingly, "while the Superfund law's citizen
suit provision only authorizes enforcement against persons 'alleged to be in viola-
tion,' EPCRA contains no such limitation. Thus, in the very law in which Congress
created EPCRA, it evinced a clear intent that citizens could pursue past violations."
Id. (emphasis added). See also Abate, supra note 45, at 25-26 (explaining that since
these two separate provisions exist, "it is fair to assume that Congress intended
EPCRA's citizen suit provision to authorize enforcement against persons who were
no longer 'in violation' at the time of suit").
Another commentator argued:
The result of the sixty-day notice period is that whenever a citizen files
suit against a party who is violating a requirement of EPCRA, the violator
can come into compliance within the notice period by filing the required
forms. If EPCRA does not allow citizen suits for past violations, the suit is
mooted. It does not seem possible for Congress to have intended that
citizens could never sue violators. The more plausible solution is that
Congress felt that citizens could take a role in ensuring that facilities com-
ply with the Act so the goals of community knowledge and chemical acci-
dent prevention plans could be met.
B6er, supra note 7, at 1628.
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leged to be in violation" from the Clean Water Act. But
there is overwhelming evidence that Congress deliberately
chose not to use that phrase in EPCRA. Every other citi-
zen suit provision in an environmental statute at the time
of EPCRA used the phrase "alleged to be in violation." As
the Court explained in its most recent decision dealing
with a citizen suit provision, the language in a statute must
be "compared with the language Congress ordinarily
uses." In EPCRA, Congress used different language from
what it used in every other citizen suit provision. 132
The language of EPCRA also differs from other environmental stat-
utes because EPCRA is strictly an informational statute. 133 Thus,
this difference in purpose and application necessitates the use of
different language.134
The language of the different acts was the central factor in
courts' analyses of whether citizen suits are authorized for wholly
past violations of EPCRA. While the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are
split concerning this issue, the Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs
bringing such actions lack standing and never offered a conclusive
statement regarding whether citizen suits are authorized for wholly
past violations of EPCRA.13 5 Additionally, the district courts that
132. Respondent's Brief at 13, Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643)
(internal citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Respondent also
noted that "Congress's decision to deviate, in EPCRA, from 'the language it ordi-
narily uses' in citizen suit provisions establishes that Congress did not want to re-
quire citizens suing under EPCRA to 'allege [the defendant] to be in violation' of
the Act at the time of the suit." Id. at 14 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154,
1162 (1997)).
133. See Respondent's Brief at 19, Steel Co. (No. 96-643). Given that EPCRA is
not a typical command and control environmental regulation, "Congress' choice
of distinctive language in Section 326, can . .. only be seen as authorizing - for
this distinctive, informational statute - citizen suits for overdue reporting viola-
tions." Id. at 20. See also Shavelson, supra note 46, at 32 (explaining statutory
scheme of EPCRA and noting that "[t] hese 'information forcing' provisions are an
integral part of EPCRA's purpose of providing timely and relevant information
about toxic and hazardous chemicals to concerned citizens").
134. See Respondent's Brief at 20, Steel Co. (No. 96-643). The respondent ex-
plained that since EPCRA is "strictly an informational statute, [t] his fundamentally
alters the way citizen suits function, and it explains why Congress used different
language in EPCRA." Id.
For a discussion of petitioner's conceptualization of EPCRA and jurisdiction
under that statute, see infra note 137.
135. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1007. For a discussion of recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning suits under EPCRA, see supra notes 17-39 and accom-
panying text.
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have addressed this issue have unanimously found that such suits
are authorized. 136
B. The Purpose of a Law also Promotes the Policy of the Law
Laws consist of more than just language; laws also capture the
spirit of the times by promoting different policies.13 7 Allowing citi-
136. For a discussion of district courts' holdings in the context of EPCRA suits
involving wholly past violations, see supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
Since a majority of informed judges agree that citizens should be able to file suit
for wholly past violations of EPCRA, it seems apparent that such suits are permissi-
ble and reflect the intent of Congress. Congressional intent, however, cannot
override constitutional mandates. To bring suits for wholly past violations, plain-
tiffs must still meet constitutional standing requirements, regardless of congres-
sional intent. Congress may use its legislative power to assist these citizen soldiers
in establishing standing by modifying EPCRA.
In reviewing the jurisdiction the citizen suit provision grants to courts, one
commentator noted that the grant of jurisdiction empowers courts to enforce all
relevant requirements and that "this language is fairly neutral ... suggest[ing] that
the violation could be wholly in the past, ongoing, or in the future. This in turn
shows that both past violations and present violations are given jurisdiction under
the EPCRA citizen suit provisions." B6er, supra note 7, at 1625-26. See also June,
supra note 11, at 767-93 (providing overview of standing requirements concerning
jurisdictional issue for environmental citizen suits).
137. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 278 (1994) (explaining that while precedent is important
in statutory interpretation, when precedents conflict, court must determine which
precedent makes most logical sense).
One commentator described the courts' determination of what the law is as
follows:
Presumably, judges "find" the law leftover after the legislative wheels stop
spinning. But what is there to find? After all, there is a statute. The
judge charged with interpreting it and the agency charged with enforcing
it each have access to a copy. Clearly there is more to finding law than being
able to locate and read a statute.
Colinvaux, supra note 130, at 1133 (emphasis added). This commentator recog-
nized that there are multiple ways in which to interpret a statute. See id. at 1133-34.
Laws, however, are created via a process which involves research and legislative
hearings. See id. at 1137-38. Once this process is complete, if a situation arises in
which the law does not clearly identify the outcome, the courts must use their
power of judicial interpretation to determine the appropriate outcome. See id.
The commentator noted that:
the judicial choice is not arbitrary but depends on context. It occurs
before a background or a legal landscape that includes factors such as the
mischief to which the statute is directed; the broader purpose of the stat-
ute; and the political, social, moral, and legal traditions of the polity. Lit-
erally, when considered without such a background, a "statute" is no
more than a text filled with combinations of letters and figures.
Id. at 1138. Likewise, the petitioner in Steel Co. involving citizen suits for wholly
past violations noted that:
in the absence of a contrary congressional intent, Congress should not be
presumed to have made a substantial change from its customary citizen
suit model. A statute conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts should
also be strictly construed, and any doubts resolved against jurisdiction.
Here there are serious doubts that Congress intended citizens to sue for
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zen suits for wholly past violations aids in achieving the objectives of
EPCRA.13 8 One commentator noted that "[n]ot only does the citi-
zen suit provision in EPCRA aid the EPA in its efforts, but it also
affords environmental groups a means of advancing their own envi-
ronmental objectives."1 39 Some courts have construed preventing
the achievement of one's environmental objectives as a redressable
injury.140
Since EPA does not have an unlimited budget,14' citizen
past EPCRA violations, and all citizen plaintiffs can highlight is a slight
difference in language and attempt to stretch that difference into federal
jurisdiction.
Petitioner's Brief at 12, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998)
(No. 96-643).
138. See Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right To Know: The
Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, I1 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 279-80 (1996) (analyzing effect and implications of
successful citizen suits under EPCRA for environmental groups). This commenta-
tor explained that one prominent environmental group, Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, has been very successful in this area:
Its victories include not only monetary penalties, but also court orders
and settlement agreements which creatively require facilities to gather
and report information over and above the minimum requirements of
the statute and to contribute money, property or services to environmen-
tally beneficial services, such as environmental groups or state and local
bodies administering EPCRA.
Id. at 280. For additional information about cases involving Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, see supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
139. Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 2. In reviewing the decision in Whiting,
one author commented that "[i]n so ruling [that successful plaintiffs can recover
attorneys fees and expert witness fees], the [district] court strongly suggested that
citizen suits promoting pollution prevention - and other supplemental environ-
mental projects (SEP) which go beyond EPCRA's statutory requirements - can
play an important role in furthering EPCRA's purposes." Shavelson, supra note 46,
at 34.
140. For a discussion of standing and redressability, see supra notes 27-33, 62-
67, 105-13 and accompanying text. See also Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforcement of
Federal Pollution Control Laws - The Citizen Suit Provisions, SB91 ALI-ABA 1097, 1106
(1997) (noting that "[c]ourts have been quick to find standing where a plaintiff or
[ ] member of [ ] plaintiff ['s] organization lives or recreates in the area affected by
a pollution source"). Referencing courts' limited ability to determine that stand-
ing exists in claims they consider, one author noted that "[s]ince Lujan, other
decisions have rejected standing for failure to identify specific imminent injuries
traceable to the claimed violation." Id.
141. See Wolf, supra note 138, at 270-76 (explaining EPA's enforcement of
environmental law). The commentator asserted:
EPCRA settlements pale in comparison with those achieved under other
federal environmental laws. EPCRA enforcement actions and penalty col-
lections by the EPA, while seemingly significant in themselves, appear to
make up only a small portion of total EPA enforcement and penalties....
Moreover, though the EPA has announced significant settlements, it re-
portedly has a checkered record in pursuing and collecting the penalties
agreed upon in settlements.
Id. at 274-75 (internal citations omitted). Further, EPA tends to use administrative
action rather than judicial action for enforcement, even though judicial action
33
Peters: Reloading the Arsenal in the Informational War on Pollution - Cit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
160 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
groups must assist EPA in its efforts to preserve the environment.1 42
Although citizen suits supplement the work of EPA, these suits do
not give citizens unyielding power to demand compliance by all
members of the regulated community.143 The citizen suit provi-
sions allow suits for failure to submit information and "[t]hese 'in-
formation forcing' provisions are an integral part of EPCRA's
purpose of providing timely and relevant information about toxic
and hazardous chemicals to concerned citizens."1 44 A lack of timely
information hinders effective community planning and not al-
lowing citizen suits for this lack of timeliness "'would render gratui-
would likely result in higher penalties. See id. at 271-72. However, "EPCRA is not
only an environmental law which the EPA can enforce but it also can be and is
used by the EPA as a tool to enforce other federal environmental laws." Id. at 273.
While EPA aggressively seeks out violators to enforce EPCRA's requirements,
"it is estimated that there are several million facilities subject to EPCRA reporting
requirements. The EPA simply lacks the resources to assure total enforcement
over all facilities." Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 2. Citizen suits are a viable alter-
native in the enforcement process. See id.
142. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 25 (commenting that because
agencies do not have resources to pursue minor violators, they must focus their
efforts on worst violators, thereby leaving gap in enforcement). Because agencies
focus their efforts on the worst violators, agencies are reluctant to make it difficult
for people to bring citizen suits as "[the agencies] often view their role as partners
with the environmental groups, working together toward the enforcement goals of
the various environmental statutes." Id.
Another commentator noted that allowing private "citizen attorney generals"
adds to the government's enforcement power. See Smith, supra note 42, at 1075.
Further, "[t] his acts as a catalyst to develop better cooperation between the public
and government, as well as to ensure the development of more accurate emer-
gency plans." Id.
143. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 22 (positing that theory of citi-
zen suits assumes citizens will bring suits where administrative agency either can-
not or will not bring suit itself). These commentators assert that "Congress
'intended citizen suits to both goad the responsible agencies to more vigorous
enforcement of the anti-pollution standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to
provide an alternative enforcement mechanism.'" Id. (quoting Baughman v. Brad-
ford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 1979)).
144. Shavelson, supra note 46, at 32. See also EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046
(providing grounds for citizen suit). A lack of timely reporting constitutes an "in-
formational" injury. See Abate, supra note 45, at 26. It has been noted that an
"[i]nformational injury exists when the government or a private party fails to pro-
vide or collect information, impairing an individual's or organization's ability to
obtain or disseminate information." Randall S. Abate & MichaelJ. Myers, Broaden-
ing the Scope of Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-In-Fact after
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 345, 346 (1994). Fur-
ther, one author noted that "[I]ate reporting cannot 'cure' informational harm
just as installing new pollution control equipment cannot 'cure' past water pollu-
tion violations. Thus, precluding EPCRA citizen suits for past violations would
thwart the goals of the statute." Abate, supra note 34, at 26.
[Vol. X: p. 127
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tous the compliance dates,' and provide the public no recourse
against violators who endanger the safety of the community."
145
Additionally, a lack of specific information concerning a chem-
ical's effects on health and the environment belittles EPCRA's role
in assisting communities with emergency planning.146 An environ-
mental group noted that the deadlines in the statute are an essen-
tial element in promoting the purpose of the law as "Congress
would not have [required annual disclosures] if outdated information
was as useful."'1 47 The filing of timely information, therefore, pro-
motes the purpose of EPCRA because current information is the
most valuable information. 148
C. The Effect of the Law Reflects the Purpose and
Policy of the Law
Nonadversial techniques are being used to encourage compli-
ance in the regulated community, rather than the command and
control techniques frequently used in the past.' 49 EPCRA is chang-
145. Smith, supra note 42, at 1071 (citing Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v.
Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F. Supp. 745, 750 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)). Citizens em-
phasized in its brief to the Supreme Court that "EPCRA can be successful only if
the information on file is accurate and up to date. Out-of-time filings, prompted
only by the theat [sic] of litigation, will not serve EPCRA's purposes." Respon-
dent's Brief at 20, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BetterEnv't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No.
96-643).
146. See Christiansen & Urquhart, supra note 85, at 250-51 (noting impor-
tance of specific information in assisting communities in emergency planning).
These commentators stated, "[w]ithout specific information on the health and en-
vironmental effects of each chemical, EPCRA would do little to aid communities in
emergency planning." Id. Also, these commentators advocated a complete analy-
sis of each chemical's potential harm, including both its toxicity as well as its route
of release and exposure. See id.
Additionally, Congress passed EPCRA to stress the free flow of information in
preparing communities for emergency response, which has in turn "proven sur-
prisingly useful and has led to some unexpected results." Michael J. Vahey, Com-
ment, Hazardous Chemical Reporting Under EPCRA: The Seventh Circuit Eliminates the
"Better Late Than Never" Excuse From Citizen Suits, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 229
(1997). "Once compiled and made available pursuant to the Act's guidelines, EP-
CRA-generated information has served as a 'benchmark' and 'catalyst' for other
environmental regulatory laws and new pollution prevention programs." Id.
147. Respondent's Brief at 12, Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (emphasis added) (dis-
cussing importance of deadline requirements in assisting communities' attempts
to protect themselves from EPCRA violators).
148. See id.
149. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 20 (stating "EPA has been
stressing innovative ways to move beyond traditional compliance toward partner-
ing with the regulated community [by emphasizing methods which promote] ...
regulatory flexibility and efforts to move 'outside the box' of traditional regula-
tions"). While citizen suits may seem traditional, the notice requirement of such
suits, as well as the structure of environmental statutes, provide an opportunity for
the regulated member and the community member to negotiate an agreement,
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ing the regulated industry's approach to hazardous chemicals
through its reporting requirements. 150 Once consumers and stock-
holders reviewed the data that existed concerning hazardous chem-
icals, they demanded that companies be responsible for their
chemicals. 151 In turn, wishing to avoid being known as either a
"polluter" or "environmentally unfriendly," companies have re-
viewed their operating procedures in attempts to reduce potential
problems with hazardous chemicals.1 52 EPCRA has changed the in-
dustry's behavior, therefore, without using expensive command and
control techniques. 153
Citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes provide the
public with more access to the courts. A conflict is therefore cre-
ated if Congress provides such access while simultaneously prohibit-
ing citizens from bringing suits. 15 4 One commentator summarized
the current trend in citizen suits for environmental protection by
which in turn allows space for creativity and cooperation among the two groups.
See id. at 21. Additionally, the "combination of strict liability and mandatory penal-
ties creates tremendous leverage for citizen plaintiffs". Id. For a discussion of the
notice requirement's purpose and its use in negotiation, see supra notes 114-18
and accompanying text. See also Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 21-23 (explaining
process of negotiating consent decree for settling environmental litigation).
150. See Wolf, supra note 138, at 286-91 (attributing change in legislation to
citizen activism). One commentator stated that "[o] ne of the most important uses
of EPCRA data by grass roots citizen and environmental groups has been to induce
or compel companies and governmental bodies to mitigate or eliminate the gener-
ation, release, or impact of toxic substances." Id. at 287. Moreover, "[e]xperience
shows that better public accountability on this score powerfully influences compa-
nies to design cleaner products." Shelley A. Hearne, Tracking Toxics: Chemical Use
and the Public's "Right-To-Know," ENV'T, July, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
151. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 30 (explaining that accounting for chem-
ical use and storage should be ingrained part of good business). These environ-
mentally-conscious consumers and stockholders may use citizen suits as a tool in
having their demands heard. See Scott, supra note 6, at 235 (explaining that sur-
rounding community which is most likely to receive benefits of enforcement
should bear costs).
152. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 30 (discussing companies attempts to
reduce potential problems). Businesses strive to keep their costs low and maxi-
mize their profits "while avoiding the public relations damage and civil liability
that follows a release of a hazardous chemical." Smith, supra note 42, at 1053.
153. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 30. "[M]arket forces have driven indus-
tries to conduct pollution prevention audits, implement company-wide policies to
protect workers and the environment, and take other proactive measures aimed at
lowering toxic releases to the environment." Id. EPCRA compliance can be valued
by looking at the total value of all the resulting environmental, health and safety
benefits. See Scott, supra note 6, at 233.
154. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (stat-
ing that citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes reflect "a deliberate
choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts, [and to ensure] .. .that
the Act[s] would be implemented and enforced"). Two commentators noted that
"[c] itizen suits are increasingly important because Congress has consistently elimi-
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stating, "[i] n short, citizens provided with timely and accurate infor-
mation can take the informed actions necessary to improve the
communities in which they live, work, and recreate."1 55 Addition-
ally, James Brusslan, an attorney for Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, stated that the recent Supreme Court decision "'will stall
Congress' efforts to clean our environment ... [and lead to] less
citizen enforcement."'1 56 Once citizens meet the jurisdictional re-
quirements, they should be able to challenge the same scope of
violations as the government can, including past violations. 157
Another key aspect of citizen suits is that any damages a court
awards go to the cost of litigation, the Treasury and environmental
nated barriers and created incentives for the private enforcement of environmen-
tal laws." Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 20-21.
Also, self-reporting schemes often fall prey to noncompliance. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 20, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No.
96-643). If the notice provision of EPCRA is designed to allow time to come into
compliance, as some contend, citizens may lose both their motivation and their
funding to investigate possible instances of noncompliance. See id. Citizens for a
Better Environment, in Steel Co., summarized this scenario as follows:
Because nearly all defendants will come into compliance once they re-
ceive notice, citizen suits under Section 326 will become virtually un-
known. In view of the importance Congress attached to citizen
enforcement - and the well-known problems of enforcement that always
plague self-reporting schemes, and that appear to afflict EPCRA as well -
it is extremely unlikely that Congress intended these results. Congress's
choice of distinctive language in Section 326, can, therefore, only be seen
as authorizing - for this distinctive, informational statute - citizen suits
for overdue reporting violations.
Id.
For a discussion of petitioner's challenge to this argument, see infra note 173.
155. Shavelson, supra note 46, at 29. For a discussion of the harmful effects of
chemical spills, see supra note 1.
In describing their interest in the outcome of the recent Supreme Court case
involving EPCRA and wholly past violations, the Amici asserted:
The thirteen organizations submitting this brief have a direct and sub-
stantial interest in this information and in enforcing EPCRA. Their mem-
bers live, breathe the air, and engage in recreational activities in areas
affected by releases of toxic chemicals by companies regulated under EP-
CRA. These toxic chemicals are known to cause significant adverse ef-
fects on human health and the environment. Amicis' members use data
reported by facilities under EPCRA to learn about toxic chemical releases
in their communities. The interests of amicis' members and their right to
know about such releases is adversely affected whenever companies fail to
file required and timely reports under EPCRA.
Amicus Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., at 1-2, Steel Co. (No. 96-
643). See also Abate & Myers, supra note 144, at 345-53 (clarifying that this lack of
information qualifies as injury under many environmental laws).
156. Chicago Reaction, supra note 29, at 1 (discussing effect of recent Supreme
Court decision on efforts to clean environment).
157. See Hecker, supra note 62, at 32-33 ("Citizens can look just as far back as
the government, if there is a risk of continuing violations at the time the complaint
was filed."). Allowing citizens to challenge this full scope of violations supports
Congress's intent in creating citizen suits provisions. See id. at 33.
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programs, and not to the citizens themselves.158 Therefore, because the
rewards of a suit will reach them only tangentially, citizens' desire to
protect their environment and maintain the well-being of their
community must motivate them. 159 By allowing citizen suits for
wholly past violations, the courts do not open the floodgates to
volumes of litigation; instead, citizens are encouraged to be active
in protecting their communities. 160 Given the context of a citizen
suit, it is reasonable to permit such suits for wholly past violations as
a proper means to reach the desired end of community well-being
158. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 21-22 (explaining limits on citi-
zen suits, including remedies). These commentators noted that "while penalties
assessed must go to the federal treasury and citizen plaintiffs are not entitled to sue
for damages, courts generally have been liberal about allowing settlements to in-
clude 'supplemental environmental projects' (SEPs) that can include payments to
environmental groups and projects." Id. at 21.
Also, since citizens may only recover their litigation costs if they prevail or
substantially prevail, citizens have "'a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy.'" Respondent's Brief at 30, Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 101 (1968)) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Respon-
dent, Citizens, noted in its brief that "EPCRA provides for 'litigation costs,' notjust
attorney's fees, so the citizen plaintiff himself will be compensated for resources
spent on the litigation. Of course, the citizen plaintiff may not show a net financial
gain, but that is true of any victorious civil plaintiff who finds that the amount of
judgment he has recovered.., is equal to or less than the costs of litigation." Id. at
30-31.
159. See Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 20 (noting that beyond litigation costs,
successful citizen plaintiffs do not enjoy collection of large monetary judgment).
While the deciding court maintains jurisdiction to award attorney fees to the suc-
cessful plaintiff, that court does not have the authority to award damages directly
to that plaintiff. See Shumate, supra note 6, at 57.
Judicially-approved consent decrees are the settlement of choice in EPCRA
suits. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 35. The benefit of consent decrees is that
they allow flexibility so that environmental goals can be met. See id. at 34-35. One
commentator noted, "in light of EPCRA's strict liability framework, coupled with
its hefty per violation penalties, plaintiffs often are in a good position to negotiate
settlements designed to maximize environmental protection." Id. at 35. Addition-
ally, citizen groups potentially could receive funds as part of a settlement which
provides for a "supplemental environmental project." Macfarlane & Terry, supra
note 63, at 21. These supplemental environmental projects, however, are further-
ing the objective of EPCRA: they protect the well-being of the environment and
the community. See Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 21-25 (explaining consent de-
crees, which often include environmental projects, as pollution reduction
bargaining).
160. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 22 (discussing citizen suits,
these commentators noted that "[t]he legislative history of the citizen suit provi-
sions reflects a strong tension 'between encouraging citizen enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal courts with excessive
numbers of citizen suits.'" (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29
(1989))). Additionally, "the [legislative] history provides an extremely limited dis-
cussion of the section 326 citizen suit provision, having only one limitation - the
inability to sue local emergency planning committees." Smith, supra note 42, at
1059.
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and protection. 6 1 Citizen suits also provide the plaintiff group,
often a not-for-profit organization, with an opportunity to recoup
the costs of filing the complaint and other related legal fees.1 6 2 If
citizens were not allowed to sue for wholly past violations, plaintiff
groups would expend large quantities of funds for little or no re-
turn, reducing the motivation of these groups to enforce compli-
ance with EPCRA.16
3
V. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations will likely lead
to the emergence of two trends: (1) citizens will be motivated to
supplement EPA's work in enforcing EPCRA and (2) industries will
be motivated to follow reporting requirements without being moni-
tored and threatened with a lawsuit.164 The federal government's
161. See Scott, supra note 6, at 235 (explaining need for timely information to
protect lives and property within community and noting "broader scope of bene-
fits resonates in improved community health and better community peace of
mind").
162. See Shavelson, supra note 46, at 33 ("EPCRA's 'fee shifting' mechanism is
a critical element for furthering the purposes of EPCRA, because without the pros-
pect of reimbursed fees and costs, most citizens and environmental groups would
be unduly hampered by the costs of litigation."). Also, because uncovering viola-
tors requires considerable amounts of time and resources, without the ability to
maintain an action for wholly past violations, citizen groups cannot recover their
fees and costs. See id. at 38. The citizen-researcher must review databases on chem-
icals found in industry as well as interpret data from government sources. See id. at
35. Additionally, the law limits formal discovery, so the citizen-researcher must
consult multiple sources of public information to determine who has violated EP-
CRA. See id. See also Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 15 (explaining that by allowing
plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees and other litiga-
tion costs, "It] his provision of EPCRA gives grass-roots environmental groups an
opportunity to help enforce many of EPCRA's requirements"); EPCRA § 326(f), 42
U.S.C. § 11046(f) (providing for award of attorney fees and costs).
163. See Amicus Brief of National Resources Defense Council, Inc., at 2, Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643) (examining
notice requirement in EPCRA, explaining how easily companies can cure viola-
tions once they receive notice and concluding that suits for wholly past violations
are necessary). The Amici stated:
This outcome [not permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations]
would destroy the deterrent effect of civil enforcement, in two ways. First,
it would discourage voluntary compliance and reward noncompliance by
the regulated community. Second, it would mean that citizen investiga-
tions and enforcement efforts against violators are a waste of time and
resources, because those violations would have a foolproof and simple
defense in nearly every case. It is therefore critical that [the Supreme
Court] affirm the decision below and reaffirm the right of citizens to sue
for violations of EPCRA's reporting requirements.
Id.
164. See Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 20 (stating that citizen suits for viola-
tions of environmental legislation are viewed as winning proposition because "EP-
CRA suits not only allow environmental groups to enforce the statute, but also
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largest environmental administrative agency, EPA, "believes that
EPCRA's implementation has caused positive changes in industry,
including fewer accidents and spills, reuse or recycling programs
... and changes in production which result in decreased chemical
releases." 165 In fact, EPCRA is viewed as one of the most effective
environmental statutes. 166 Furthermore, one commentator noted
that once the public receives "sufficient, comprehensible data," this
knowledge "should drive individuals to make the correct economic
and political decisions concerning industry's use of toxic
substances."167
force industries to pay civil penalties for their violations"). These citizen suits assist
non-profit organizations in furthering their agendas, which include protecting
both the environment and health and well-being of members of the community.
See id. at 20-21.
Additionally, environmental consultants, whether representing industry or
non-profit groups, recognize the value of pollution prevention programs and be-
lieve that in the long term, such programs will actually save industry money. See id.
at 23. Two commentators stated:
Under the new reality, you answer to a potentially infinite number of
bosses. Your success [as a company] in meeting the environmental stan-
dards is subject to review by the state regulators, EPA, criminal investiga-
tors, local governments, other companies, community groups, and citizen
suit lawyers. The sole measure of your performance is strict compliance
with all permit and regulatory requirements.
Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 63, at 23. These commentators also note that regu-
lations need to be created that can be met 100 percent of the time, as there are few
defenses or exceptions that can be used against a citizen suit. See id. at 24-25.
165. Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 32. Respondent, Citizens, highlighted the
effectiveness of the Act in its brief by noting, "[t]he overall effects of EPCRA have
been dramatic: Reported releases of toxic chemicals by firms complying with EP-
CRA have been reduced nearly 46 percent since 1988." Respondent's Brief at 3,
Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (citing Environmental Protection Agency, 1995 Toxics Re-
lease Inventory Public Data Release (May, 1997)).
Social psychologists have theorized that "as humans have learned to master
the environment, they have also learned how to destroy it." ELLIOT ANDERSON ET
AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY- THE HEART AND THE MIND 561 (1994). When the public is
aware of a company's action, however, the company is more likely to follow norma-
tive demands, rather than promote its own self-interest. See id. at 570. EPCRA, by
requiring reporting of hazardous chemicals and the dissemination of this informa-
tion to the public, creates a monitoring situation which is associated with positive
environmental behavior. See EPCRA § 311-13, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-23.
166. See Respondent's Brief at 1, Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (citations omitted). See
also Christiansen & Urquhart, supra note 85, at 259 ("As the most recent EPA re-
port under EPCRA noted, the public's environmental awareness has been en-
hanced by the Act.").
Additionally, one commentator adamantly asserted, "[i] n order to ensure that
EPCRA's provisions are given full effect and substance, the Supreme Court must
conclude that citizens can hold facilities liable for all violations, past or present,
and thereby discourage corporations from contravening EPCRA's mandates."
Lohmann, supra note 11, at 1712.
167. Liu, supra note 118, at 336. Multiple facets of pollution prevention that
are related to the right to know have been identified as: "[1] industry's duty to
disclose information pertaining to its use of hazardous substances, [2] the public's
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Some oppose EPCRA because of its potential to create massive
paperwork and inefficient dissemination of information. 168 By edu-
cating themselves about interpreting information, environmental
organizations are enabling themselves to take proactive meas-
ures. 169 The success of EPCRA is related to its purely informational
nature170 and "EPCRA seeks to achieve its environmental goals not
through regulatory mandates but through the disclosure of pollut-
ing activity."' 7 '
Additionally, businesses may find it more cost-effective to com-
ply with EPCRA's requirement than to face hefty penalties and the
associated public image difficulties, such as being known as "envi-
ronmentally unfriendly."' 72 Furthermore, EPCRA's citizen suit pro-
vision is not an opportunity for the United States' environmentally
right to access such information, and [3] the community's need to develop emer-
gency notification and response plans for accidental release." Id. at 335.
168. See Anthes, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that because data collected will be
highly technical, it will be almost useless to average lay person in community).
Advocating against this generation of paperwork, W. Glover, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration Oversight Committee, declared
"[p]aperwork and reporting requirements remain a major cost problem for small
businesses. Small companies do not have specially hired staff to complete the myr-
iad of reports required by government." Prepared Statement of W. Glover, Na-
tional Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, FED. NEWS SERV.,
Mar. 5, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Crnws File. For a discussion of
Representative Lent's critical view on the effective use of data, see supra notes 51-
52 and accompanying text.
169. See Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 18 (emphasizing that with focus on
whether owners or operators filed reports in timely manner, "[i]f citizen groups
can determine which facilities are required to report under EPCRA, they can usu-
ally make strong cases against violators"); see also Christiansen & Urquhart, supra
note 85, at 259 (highlighting that EPCRA has increased awareness among general
community and people are therefore more alert to potential environmental
problems).
170. See Respondent's Brief at 1, Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (citing General Ac-
counting Office, Toxic Chemicals: EPA's Toxic Release Inventory is Useful But Can Be
Improved 32 (June 1991)).
171. Respondent's Brief at 2, Steel Co. (No. 96-643).
172. See Smith, supra note 42, at 1076-77 (characterizing non-compliant busi-
nesses as "Public Enemy" in opinion of environmental activists); see also Fred Zim-
merman, A Small Business Environmental Primer; Information on Different
Environmental Protection Laws, NAT. PUBLIC Accr., June, 1992, at 18 (emphasizing
that companies realize that compliance with environmental regulations improves
business operations and products). One commentator noted that "companies are
experiencing a more positive public image and appear to benefit from an increase
in customer demand for their products if the customers are aware of a company's
compliance record with the appropriate environmental statutes and regulations."
Id. Creating a positive trusting public image aids companies not only in their cur-
rent transactions, but also in future transactions, including applying for construc-
tion permits. See Peter H. Anderson, Emissions Management Program Plays Major Role
in Pollution Prevention: From Pulp and Paper Mills, PULP & PAPER, Sept. 1991, at 129.
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conscious to attack the "big, bad corporation."1 73 It gives citizens
an opportunity to promote their own well-being and interests where
the government either cannot afford, or refuses, to act.174
While promoters of a pollution controlled earth are afforded
the opportunity to litigate pollution cases, there are other options
available that are widely used. In many instances, the parties settle
outside of court by creating a consent agreement. 175 These consent
decrees promote the aims and policies of EPCRA: 1) they force the
violator to report needed information and permit the prosecuting
entity to recoup attorney fees; and 2) they authorize the prosecut-
ing entity to funnel some of the penalties into programs that will
173. See Respondent's Brief at 2 n.I (No. 96-643) (stating that "[i]ndeed, even
petitioner acknowledges that EPCRA has proved effective."). The petitioner com-
mented that "[t]he United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ac-
knowledges that financial incentives, in addition to EPCRA's reporting obligations,
motivate industry to reduce its emissions. Whatever its role, EPCRA has contrib-
uted to the significant improvement in the nation's environmental quality over the
past decade." Petitioner's Brief at 6, Steel Co. (No. 96-643) (internal citations
omitted).
Noting that citizens act as a cross between private attorney generals and pri-
vate litigants, one commentator stated that the citizen suit is "a hybrid cause of
action to vindicate a mixture of public and private rights .... " Hecker, supra note
62, at 31. When bringing this type of suit, "[c]itizens assert their own rights to be
free of harm from pollutant releases, but their enforcement powers are similar to
those of the government." Id. at 31.
174. For a discussion of citizen suits as supplemental to government enforce-
ment, see supra notes 119-62 and accompanying text. Additionally, some recog-
nize that in order for public policy to improve the environment, it must not only
be designed well, but enforced well, also. See Wendy Naynerski & Tom Tietenberg,
Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law, LAND ECON., Feb. 1992, at 28.
These commentators noted:
When profit-making firms ignore the social consequences of their activi-
ties, they may be maximizing their profits while making choices which do
not maximize social net benefits. Environmental problems represent one
well-known example of this type of inefficient behavior. In absence of
some kind of external restraint [i.e., citizen suits] a polluting firm will
typically produce too much pollution.
Id.
Petitioner in Steel Co., emphasizing the floodgate argument, stated that
"[r]espondents' interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit would change the
nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive. We cannot
agree that Congress intended such a result." Petitioner's Brief at 21, Steel Co. (No.
96-643).
175. See Falkenberry, supra note 42, at 21-22 (noting that since industries
often prefer to negotiate consent decrees rather than accept risks associated with
litigating dispute, citizen groups have good amount of leverage and can demand
that violator pay maximum amount of damages possible). In fact,
"[e] nvironmental groups can attempt to hash out agreements which help promote
the group's agenda, beyond statutory compliance .... [and can propose] that a
targeted facility take corrective measures with regard to their emissions which can
be credited against penalty amounts." Id. Also, these consent decrees allow the
court which approved the decree to monitor and enforce pollution prevention
programs, creating a more solid change in industrial behavior. See id. at 24.
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promote environmental well-being. 176 This process helps to protect
the well-being of both the environment and the community, which
is consistent with EPCRA's goal of promoting the dissemination of
information to enable people to make informed choices regarding
where to work, live and play.177
Prohibiting suits for wholly past violations would preclude citi-
zens from fully effectuating the intent of EPCRA. 17 8 Through an
examination of the language, case law and policies supporting and
surrounding EPCRA, one may logically conclude that EPCRA's citi-
zen suit provision was designed to permit citizen suits for wholly
past violations. 179 Citizen suits have been described as "creat[ing] a
limited cause of action in private citizens to abate and deter a nui-
sance - the pollution of the nation's environmental resources."' 8 0
Our technological reality is that we do not understand the full ef-
fects of environmental pollutants and hazardous chemicals and,
therefore, cannot invent proper management systems.181 In the in-
176. See Christiansen & Urquhart, supra note 85, at 259 (stressing that citizens
and EPA are both actively and seriously pursuing enforcement and stating, " [f] ines
for failing to comply with the Act are climbing every year, as are the number of
enforcement actions brought by the EPA under EPCRA"). For a discussion of the
policy supporting EPCRA's creation, see supra notes 40-52, 137-62 and accompany-
ing text.
177. See Amicus Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., at 1-2, Steel
Co. (No. 96-643) (explaining their members' interest in outcome of this case by
highlighting that their members use information under EPCRA's reporting re-
quirements to develop plans and make decisions regarding where to live and to
recreate).
178. See Scott, supra note 6, at 238-41 (suggesting that Congress or EPA could
establish enforcement structure to encourage environmental activists to work for
compliance with EPCRA via citizen suits, but discourage frivolous suits designed
purely to pursue possibility of recovering attorneys' fees). Citizen suits are also
important because "[g]iving the right to sue for wholly past violations exclusively
to the EPA overburdens the agency and ensures that some noncompliant facilities
will escape punishment." Id. at 239.
179. For a discussion of courts that considered whether citizens may main-
tain suits for wholly past violations under EPCRA, see supra notes 17-39, 68-124 and
accompanying text.
180. Hecker, supra note 62, at 31. One commentator emphasized that citi-
zens suits neither reduce nor transfer governmental powers of enforcement, but
instead allow a private cause of action for those citizens meeting the statutorily
prescribed standing requirements. See id. Because the executive branch has not
delegated any of its enforcement power to citizens, but has merely created a mech-
anism for citizens to act on their own behalf, courts have uniformly concluded that
citizen suit provisions are constitutional. See id.
181. See Al Gore, Natural Disasters Should Serve as a Wake-Up Call, STAR TRIBUNE,
Apr. 27, 1997, at 19A (commenting "[b]usiness must develop the right technolo-
gies for the next century.... [and] each and every one of us must make environ-
mental protection a part of our daily lives"). Mr. Gore noted, "we must remember
that global climate change is a problem without immediate or easy solutions." Id.
(emphasis added). Vice-President Gore also discussed the challenge environmen-
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terim, until environmental reality and technological reality are on
the same plane, it is necessary to promote and enforce environmen-
tal protection legislation to prepare for the changing world of the
future. Because this promotion and enforcement includes allowing
broad interpretations of environmental legislation such as EPCRA,
citizen suits for wholly past violations are a viable and valuable
weapon in the war against environmental destruction. The man-
date now falls on Congress to provide these rugged soldiers with
"actionable" legs on which to stand. By amending EPCRA, Con-
gress will allow citizen soldiers to march forward in strategic har-
mony in an effort to win the war against pollution.
Lori May Peters
tal protection poses and the need to inform people about toxic chemicals in their
neighborhoods so that they can protect them. See id. Further, he stated that envi-
ronmental technologies is a growth area "already worth $400 billion each year."
Id.
The student author offers the following conclusions. As the Supreme Court
articulated, the standing issue forces a more critical look at EPCRA. In order to
rectify the standing problems, a legislative response is necessary - either by modi-
fying the sixty-day notice requirement or by modifying the statute to explicitly
grant jurisdiction to federal courts for hearing allegations of wholly past violations
under EPCRA. Further, a review of the consistency between an environmental
organization's purpose and the purpose of suing for wholly past violations needs to
be examined. Since the two purposes of the environmental organization and the
purpose of suing for wholly past violations are both aimed at protecting the envi-
ronment, the redressability requirement must be examined so that a constitution-
ally identifiable injury and remedy are specified and written into the amended
version of EPCRA. The value of this information mandates that Congress not sit
idly, waiting for another chemical disaster before it acts to remedy the current
shortcomings in the law.
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